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Labor Market Segregation  
and the Wage Differential  
between Resident and Migrant Workers in China 
  
 
by 
 
 
LU Ruosi 
 
 
Master of Philosophy 
 
 
 
This thesis looks at the effect of industrial and occupational segregation on the wage 
differential between resident and migrant workers in China. It extends the work of Meng 
and Zhang (2001) by considering the possible employment segregation of resident and 
migrant workers by both industry and occupation. I contend that industry segregation is 
at least as important as occupational segregation for Chinese migrant workers, as most 
migrant workers in China have come from the countryside to fuel the booming 
labor-intensive manufacturing and construction industries in the cites. Due to the hukou 
policy (a household registration system) in China, migrant workers normally face more 
constraints in searching for jobs in other sectors. My empirical study confirms that the 
proportion of the resident-migrant worker wage differential that is explained by 
industrial segregation is much larger than that explained by occupational segregation. 
Taking both industrial and occupational segregation into account explains the substantial 
wage differential between resident and migrant workers, which indicates the influence of 
industrial and occupational barriers on the wage differential in China. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
After 30 years of economic reform, China has been transformed from a 
predominantly agricultural economy into an industrial powerhouse. Its urban 
population has increased from about 12% of the total population in the late 1970s to 
40% in 2006 (China Statistical Year Book), a result not only of the rapid rate of 
urbanization but also of a dramatic increase in the rural to urban migration rate. It is 
now estimated that there are approximately 0.18 billion rural migrant workers 
working in the cities who account for more than 50% of the labor force in China’s 
industrial sector1.  
 
Despite such a fast rate of industrialization and urbanization, income inequality in 
China as measured both in terms of coastal versus inland and urban versus rural 
workers has been widening since the mid-1980s. According to the estimation of Lin, 
Wang, and Zhao (2004), the coast-inland income ratio rose from 1.31 in 1985 to 1.65 
in 2000, and the urban-rural income ratio rose from 1.82 in 1985 to 2.42 in 2000. 
Such a rise in inequality may appear at odds with conventional economic theory, 
which predicts factor price equalization accompanied by the movement of labor from 
the countryside to the city or from agricultural activities to industrial activities. As 
has been repeatedly shown by previous researchers in this area, an important factor 
that contributes to this anomaly is the government’s special control on internal 
migration through the household registration system, or hukou system in China (For 
example, Yang 1999, Whalley and Zhang 2004, Lu and Chen 2006). In brief, China’s 
                         
1 See the reports by Xinhua News Agency on January 18 and February 24, 2006 (www.xinhuanet.com). 
According to Cai (2007), kinds of information also shows there are about 0.103 or 0.118 billion rural migrants in 
2004. According to the National Bureau of Statistic (2008), at the end of 2006, rural migrants are about 0.132 
billion. And Ministry of Labour and Social Security reports they may reach 0.12 billion (Laodong He Shehui 
Baozhang Bu Diaoyanzu 2006). 
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household registration system specifies that individuals must register with the local 
authority at their place of birth, and only registered local people are entitled to the 
various welfare programs provided by the local government, which include housing, 
education, health care, unemployment benefits, and income support. Various 
unemployment reduction policies are also targeted at local residents only. This 
system greatly disadvantages migrant workers, and helps to create a two-tier labor 
market in the cities. For example, according to recent surveys (see footnote 1 for the 
source), rural migrant workers are highly concentrated in low-end, labor-intensive 
jobs. The survey in 2007 by Ministry of Agriculture also shows manufacturing, 
construction and catering service industry contained 67% of all rural migrants (Ji 
2007). The Summary Report of Rural Migrant Workers in China (Zhongguo 
Nongmingong Wenti Yanjiu Zong Baogao Qicao Zu 2006) suggests that in 2004 
30.3% of rural migrants work in manufacture industry, and 22.9% of them in 
construction industry. The research team of Ministry of Labour and Social Security 
(Laodong he Shehui Baozhang Bu Diaoyanzu 2006) reports that the manufacture 
industry consists of 68% rural migrants and the number in the construction one is 
almost 80%. When it comes to the catering service, personal services and domestic 
work, and the dustman job, the number increases to above 90% (Nongye Bu 
Diaoyanzu 2006). These percentages contrast sharply to the average level all over the 
country in the way that from 1998 to 2006, the percentage of the employees in 
service sector is increasing faster than that in manufacturing one2 (China Statistics 
Yearbook). Other surveys indicate that rural migrant workers seldom signed formal 
labor contracts with their employers, and their average wage is just more than half of 
resident urban workers’. Many migrant workers are not paid on time and have to 
                         
2 In 1998, the percentage of employees in the manufacturing sector is 23.5% of the sum of employees in all 
sectors and that in the service sector is 26.7%. In 2006, the former is 25.2% while the latter increases to 32.2%. 
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work extremely long hours without overtime pay3.  
 
The status and treatment of these rural migrant workers is so alarming that it is now 
high on the policy agenda of the central government4. However, the issue of wage 
inequality between urban resident and rural migrant workers is complicated by the 
fact that the average educational level of rural migrant workers is also significantly 
lower than that of their urban counterparts. Any government policies that aim to 
reduce the wage inequality between these two groups must carefully distinguish the 
wage differential that is created by institutional or discriminative forces from that 
generated by normal market forces. Thus far, there have been only several empirical 
studies to estimate the exact impact of potential labor market segregation on wage 
inequality between urban and rural migrant workers.  
 
The work of Meng and Zhang (2001) is pioneering in this respect. They utilize the 
data from two surveys conducted in 1999 for Shanghai and the methodology 
developed by Brown et al. (1980) to decompose wage differential into the 
productivity effect, occupational segregation effect, and wage discrimination effect. 
Their decomposition shows that occupational segregation only contributes roughly 
                         
3 For example, according the survey in Cai and Du (2007), during 2003 and 2005, the average wage of rural 
migrant workers increases from 781 Yuan to 953, while that for urban residents is from 1170 to 1534 Yuan (pp. 
23-30). A piece of news in 2005 says that in the recent 12 years, rural migrants’ wage only rise by 68 Yuan 
(Yangcheng Wanbao 2005). In the survey of Ministry of Agriculture (Nongye Bu Diaochazu 2006), the average 
wage of migrant workers is 60% of that for their resident counterpart, and in 2004 only 12.5% of migrants have 
labor contracts with their employers. Wage delay is still popular among migrant workers and average work time 
for them is 11 hours per day, and over 26 days per month. 76% of them never enjoyed overtime pay (Zhongguo 
Nongmingong Wenti Yanjiu Zong Baogao Qicao Zu, 2006). Only 47.78% of migrant workers got their wage on 
time (Zhu and Tao 2006). 
4 During the National People’s Congress and meetings of the National Committee of the CPPCC in 2004, 
Premier Wen Jiabao pledged to tackle the thorny issue of defaulted construction costs and wage arrears for 
migrant workers in the construction sector in his government work report. On January 18, 2006, the central 
government announced No. 10 gazette in 2006 (“Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan Gongbao 2006 Nian 
Di 10 Hao”) named “Guowuyuan Guanyu Jiejue Nongmingong Wenti de Ruogan Yijian (Government’s 
suggestions about settling the problem of rural migrant workers)”. The Vice-minister of Labor and Social 
Security also declared “we will exert our utmost to tackle the farm workers’ wage arrears issue and provide them 
with the same social security protection as their urban peers.” 
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4.85% of the total wage differential, whereas intra-occupational factors account for 
82%. This rather surprising finding rejects the assumption that occupational 
segregation is an important factor leading to the wage gap. On the other hand, Wang 
(2005b) argues that the insignificant impact of labor market segregation on wage 
differentials in Meng and Zhang (2001) is caused by the improper segregation 
measure they adopt. Wang (2005b) suggests that, besides occupation, ownership of 
enterprises is also an important factor contributing to labor market segment of China 
since the state-owned enterprises are more likely to hire local residents. Following 
Meng and Zhang (2001), she uses a year 2002 dataset from five cities5 and divides 
the sample into four types according to both occupation and ownership: people 
self-employed, people working in the state-owned enterprises, and blue- and 
white-collar workers in non-state-owned enterprises, respectively. She finds that 
58.73% of the wage gap is due to the between-sector factors, in which 26.93% of the 
gap is caused by between-sector discrimination. On the other hand, 15.96% is by 
within-sector discrimination. This new classification improves the influence of labor 
market segregation dramatically, which is now a more important reason than wage 
discrimination to explain the wage gap.  
 
Different from the above two studies, Sylvie et al. (2008) argue that migrants and 
residents have contrasted occupational distribution across different types of 
ownership of enterprises, which also have different wage-setting structures, thus they 
adopt only type of ownership of enterprises as the measure of labor market 
segregation. Their data are from twelve provinces6 of China in 2002, covering the 
main economy areas. They employ the extended form of Brown et al. (1980) 
                         
5 They are Shanghai, Wuhan, Fuzhou, Xi’an, and Shenyang. 
6 The twelve provinces are Anhui, Beijing, Chongqing, Gansu, Guangdong, Henan, Hubei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, 
Shanxi, Sichuan and Yunnan. 
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decomposition, adding a new item of hourly wage effect to account for the effect of 
working time. Their conclusion is that the main source of wage gap is the 
endowment difference between migrants and residents (explains 138% of the wage 
gap), that is to say, on-job discrimination, including both wage discrimination (46%) 
and labor market segregation (2%), may not be important at all. They also propose an 
explanation for the insignificant segregation effect in the former studies: it is because 
migrants and residents have different comparative advantage in private sector and 
public sector, respectively. The migrant population has higher return to their 
characteristics in the private sector than residents, thus increasing migrants’ 
participation into the public sector does not necessarily improve their average 
earnings. (Sylvie et al. 2008)  
 
My thesis will adopt traditional theoretical framework based on occupations and 
follow Meng and Zhang (2001)’s analysis. Careful investigation of the labor market 
segregation that rural migrant workers in China are faced would give rise to another 
perspective that industry segregation is an important factor that may lead to wage gap. 
Industry premium has been seen as one of the sources of wage differentials for a long 
time7. The best example is the education industry: the blue-collar workers in the 
education industry may have high wage, while workers in the same occupation of 
manufacturing industry may earn much less. Investigation shows in 2002, the highest 
average industrial wage is 19135 Yuan, being three times as much as the lowest one 
(6398 Yuan). In fact, the wage differentials leading by industrial segregation keep 
increasing in recent years, and become even more obvious than that leading by 
regional difference (Cai et al. 2006). Therefore the consideration of only 
                         
7 Please refer to the literature review part in Krueger and Summers (1988). 
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occupational segregation will underestimate the influence of the segregation factor to 
the wage gap. Besides, since state-owned enterprises monopolize many 
high-earnings- and high-welfare-industries in service sector, such as banking and 
insurance, education and research institutions, media industry, and government or 
party agencies, adopting ownership as a measure of segregation can also be seen as 
introducing industry factor to some extent8. At last, China’s hukou system offers a 
good institutional background for the study of industry-occupational segregation 
because persons who belong to the same race and nation are treated differently when 
looking for jobs just because they have different hukou locations following their 
parents. 
 
It is by considering the industry factor that the current study makes its contribution. 
More specifically, I extend the Brown et al. (1980) approach by taking into account 
both the industry and occupational segregation effects. In so doing, I separate 
workers into four groups: blue-collar workers in the industrial sector, white-collar 
workers in the industrial sector, blue-collar workers in the service sector, and 
white-collar workers in the service sector. Furthermore, my study utilizes data from a 
1998 survey conducted by the Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies in Oslo 
and the National Research Center for Science and Technology for Development 
(NRCSTD), which was the first integrated survey of resident and migrant workers 
covering several major Chinese cities. The survey also collected detailed information 
on the personal and job characteristics of the respondents, which enables me to better 
estimate the first-stage multinomial logit models of job attainment. My results show 
that 47% of the wage differential is attributable to between-group effects, and 20% is 
                         
8 Though Sylvie et al. (2008) adopt extension of Brown et al. (1980), their approach is much different from 
others and mine. Thus I will not consider their results here. 
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associated with industry and occupational segregation (unexplained between-group 
effects). This finding confirms that labor market segregation is indeed an important 
factor that contributes to the wage inequality between urban resident and rural 
migrant workers.  
 
The remainder of the thesis is as follows. I outline my empirical methodology in 
Chapter 2. Chapter 3 tells the story of industrial segregation in China. Chapter 4 
describes the data and sample characteristics. I present and discuss my empirical 
findings in Chapter 5, 6, and 7. Chapter 8 concludes the thesis. 
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Chapter 2. Methodology 
 
The Blinder-Oaxaca (1973) decomposition approach is the most popular method for 
analyzing the wage differential. The implementation of this approach requires the 
estimation of a wage determination equation, and the specification of the wage 
equation is mainly based on the human capital theory. The rationale of this approach 
is that a wage differential can be decomposed into two parts: one that can be 
explained by human capital factors and the other that cannot be explained by 
observed individual productivity characteristics and is hence ascribed to labor market 
discrimination. However, as Oaxaca and Neuman (1998) point out, there exist two 
obvious deficiencies in Blinder-Oaxaca (1973) approach: one is that as 
discrimination can take the form of both unequal access to jobs and unequal 
treatment in the same job, this method is unable to distinguish which form 
contributes more to the observed wage differential. The other is that though job status 
will influence the wage level, the latter may also contribute to access to different jobs, 
and lead to the endogeneity problem. To settle the first problem, Brown et al. (1980) 
decomposition may work, while to the second one, Inverse Mill’s Ratio (IMR) in 
Heckman (1976 and 1979)’ and Lee (1983)’s selectivity correction method will help.  
 
Brown et al. (1980) extend the Blinder-Oaxaca approach by explicitly incorporating 
the effect of occupational segregation in their decomposition. They assume that there 
may be unequal access to occupations for minority or disadvantaged workers in the 
labor market. As long as the factors that determine a worker’s choice of occupation 
are not completely the same as those that influence a worker’s wage, the 
Blinder-Oaxaca type of wage decomposition may be biased. Similarly, if one 
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believes that there is unequal access to industries for rural migrant workers in China, 
then potential bias may also arise if industry choice is not controlled for. In this thesis, 
I extend the method of Brown et al. (1980) by explicitly taking into account the 
choice of both industry and occupation when estimating the wage equation and 
decomposing wage differentials.  
 
More specifically, let us assume the wages for urban resident and rural migrant 
workers are determined by the following Mincerian wage equations. 
k
j
k
j
k
j
k
j Xw εβ +=ln   k =u, r and j = 1,…, J ,          (1) 
where the superscripts u and r denote urban resident and rural migrant workers, 
respectively; w is the earnings of a worker in job j (for simplicity, I suppress the 
individual subscript i in the equation) and j is an industry-occupation indicator; X is a 
vector of the individual and job characteristic variables that affect a worker’s pay; β 
is the unknown parameter to be estimated; and ε is the error term.  
 
Next, I assume that the individual industry or occupation choice is determined by the 
following multinomial logit model. 
∑
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γ   k =u, r; n = 1,…, N and j = 1 ,…, J,    (2) 
where knjp  is the probability that individual n is working in the jth category of the 
industry-occupation; N is the sample size; J is the total number of 
industry-occupation categories; Z represents a vector of the exogenous variables that 
affect labor supply and demand; and γ is its coefficient. As each individual must 
select one industry-occupation, only J–1 sets of coefficients are uniquely defined. I 
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choose to normalize the coefficients for the first industry-occupation category 
(blue-collar workers in the industrial sector) to be zero.  
 
Following Brown et al. (1980), the wage differential of urban residents and rural 
migrant workers can be decomposed as: 
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The upper bars denote the average, and the upper hats denote the predicted values. 
The term WE is the explained wage differential due to differences in personal 
characteristics; WU is the unexplained wage differential due to differences in the 
coefficients of the estimated resident and migrant wage equations; BE is the 
explained between-industry-occupation wage differential due to differences in 
qualifications in an industry-occupation group; and BU is the unexplained wage 
differential due to differences in the structures of industry-occupational attainment. 
Therefore, the foregoing wage decomposition approach takes into account not only 
the wage discrimination that arises from doing the same job (WU), but also the wage 
discrimination that arises from unequal access to jobs (BU). These two parts reflect 
two basic rights in Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention9: equal 
pay and equal access (Li 2006). As an extension of Brown et al. (1980), I define jobs 
by both occupation and industry, which allows me to take into account the labor 
market segregation that arises both from occupation barriers and industry barriers.  
 
The estimation of (1) and (2) will be more efficient if we also take into account the 
fact that there may be unobserved variables that affect both the wage and 
industry-occupation choices of workers, and thus the error terms of (1) and (2) may 
                         
9 China has subscribed this convention in August, 2005. 
11 
 
be correlated (Heckman 1976 and 1979, Lee 1983). To consider this fully, a 
two-stage selectivity model will be estimated. In the first stage, (2) is estimated, and 
in the second stage the following wage equation is estimated. 
k
j
k
j
k
j
k
j
k
j
k
j eXw ++= λαβln ,                  (3) 
where kjλ is the estimated IMR from the first stage of the estimation. I estimate this 
multinomial selectivity model separately for urban resident and rural migrant 
workers. To further improve the efficiency of the estimation, (2) and (3) are both 
estimated by the maximum likelihood method using LIMDEP. However, the 
achieved IMR could be problematic since it is difficult to find out variables that are 
fully exogenous. In order to assure the robustness of the outcome, I will report two 
sets of empirical results, without and with selectivity correction respectively. 
Comparison will be made between them and finally I will choose the results with 
selectivity correction. 
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Chapter 3. The industrial segregation in China 
 
There are three aspects about the industrial segregation in China. First, the 
appearance of industrial segregation has its historical reason. Second, the pattern for 
nowadays migrants to search for jobs is easy to lead them to crowd into limited 
industries. Third, other points may help us understand this situation better, such as 
government policy and low substitutability between migrant and resident workers. 
Notice that since my data are gathered at the end of 1998, I will adopt information 
around 2000 to depict the situation at that time. However, the latest data is also 
employed when possible to help understanding.  
 
3.1. The historical reason 
 
At the early period of the economic reform (1984-1988), rural migrant workers are 
introduced mainly by the government into labor-intensive industries. This can be 
understood from the aspects of labor demand and supply. As for labor demand, it 
increases rapidly in urban areas based on a boom of the manufacture industry and 
service sector, such as urban construction (Zhao, Yaohui 2000), textile industry, retail 
sales, nursemaiding (Mallee 2000), etc.. They engender an urgent hunger for un- and 
semi-skilled, low-paid, and flexible labor (Solinger 1999b, pp. 47 and pp. 198-199). 
As for labor supply, there are several reasons. First, the employment problem of city 
youth was just settled (Xue 1988) and under the protection of the “iron rice bowl” 
institutional arrangement, urban residents keep a high employment rate though with 
moderate wage. Second, the improvement in living standards in the cities, as well as 
the new employment opportunities appearing in foreign-capital enterprises (Feng and 
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Jiang 1988), leads urban residents to become unwilling to work for those traditional 
jobs with relatively low pay and poor working conditions (Zhao, Yaohui 2000). 
Coupled with the slowdown of urban natural population increase, appears a shortage 
of urban labor supply (Mallee 2000). On the other hand, third, millions of rural 
laborers are released by the agriculture reform, which means the abundant rural labor 
supply (Taylor 1988). Because of the above two perspectives of labor demand and 
supply, also to avoid the heavy pressure on public facilities and services, the 
government permits the rural laborers to work in several urban industries first, and 
then opens the other ones gradually (Zhao, Yaohui 2000). Thus, the initial 
rural-urban migrants are concentrated in limited industries, all of which are 
physically exhausting, dangerous and dirty10.  
 
3.2. The low bargaining power for migrants 
 
After 1988, rural migrants are able to work in cities more and more freely, and "tide 
of rural laborers" appears at the beginning of 1990s. There are mainly four ways for 
migrants to find their jobs (Zhao, Shukai 2000). The most important way is through 
relatives and local fellows who have arrived in the city, i.e. social network. Migrant 
networks offer money for loans, company for the trip, a welcome mat upon arrival, 
reduction in the psychological costs of moving, food the migrant was accustomed to, 
and, most important of all, a job (Roberts 2000). Usually pioneers go to the city and 
find jobs first and then introduce their relatives and friends to the same jobs in the 
same industry (For example, Knight 2002, Mallee 2000, Solinger 1999b, pp. 176-178, 
Zhao 1997, Zhao, Shukai 2000, Zhao 2001). Though this trend has weakened, today 
                         
10 “According to Banister and Taylor (1989), there were already 5 million rural construction workers in urban 
areas in 1988.” Cited from Zhao, Yaohui (2000). 
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65% of rural migrant workers still depend on social network to find their urban jobs 
(Laodong He Shehui Baozhang Bu Diaoyanzu 2006). This pattern also consists with 
that of international migration (Boyd 1989, Hugo 1981, Mckenzie and Rapoport 
2007). The second way is through enterprise recruitment with the help of local 
government or just through the co-operation among governments, which follows the 
traditional method at the very beginning of the reform (Solinger 1999b, pp.178-182). 
The third one is to take advantage of employment agencies (Solinger 1999b, 
pp.182-184). Because of the relatively high service fee, only a small part of migrants 
choose this approach. However, as the government attaches increasing importance to 
rural migrants’ employment problem in recent years, the fee is lowered and 
thus more and more migrants begin to consider this approach. The last is to search 
for jobs by oneself. We may infer from common sense that the person adopts the 
fourth method, to some extent, has more ability than the one who is through other 
three methods. 
 
Though having the above four ways, instead of the relatively simple method (only 
through government) before 1988, most of the migrants still have to be kept in 
manufacturing industry because of their low bargaining power. For the historical 
reason of industrial concentration I mentioned, migrants depending on social network 
seem most inclined to enter manufacturing industry following their pioneers. Also, it 
is still true for the traditional way through government and enterprises. The other two 
methods depend on market and are likely to have more job choices and chances than 
the first two. However, two existing factors limit migrants’ ability to bargain with 
employers: One is their lack of citizenship, and the other is restricted financial 
support at their first arriving in the city. The content of the citizenship includes kinds 
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of social welfare, like unemployment insurance11, medical insurance and other 
government support and public goods rationing (Solinger 1999b, Wang 1999). 
Whether a person deserves the citizenship from local government relies on the 
possession of local household registration (hukou). This institutional barrier makes 
China’s internal migrants comparable to undocumented international immigrants in 
other countries (Roberts 2000, Solinger 1999a and 1999b, pp.5). On one hand, 
migrants without local hukou are kept from those social welfare; on the other hand, 
they need pay kinds of extra fees on their living and attaining jobs, enduring possible 
exploitation from local bureaucracy (Liu 2006, Roberts 2000, Solinger 1999b, 
pp.75-77, Zhao, Yaohui 2000). As Zhao, Yaohui (2000) says, according to a sample 
survey by the MOL (Ministry of Labor) on rural migrant workers in large cities, 
these cards and certificates cost a migrant worker 223 yuan per year in 1996. This is 
much higher than the cost standards set by the MOL that totaled at most 20 yuan. It 
implies that these new regulations became new possibilities for over-charging 
migrants by all levels of government. Furthermore, most of them have no more than 
400 Yuan when entering the city at the end of 1990s (Cai 1997), only twice as much 
as the lowest urban living standard per month even without considering 
accommodations 12 . Taking into account other disadvantages resulting from 
rural-urban migration, it is natural for migrants to find jobs as soon as possible and 
thus lower their reserve wages.  
 
Some evidence on migrants’ job search costs may help us understand the above 
                         
11 The unemployment insurance for urban residents consists of three parts: unemployment insurance, basic living 
standard for urban life, and for state-owned lay-off employees. 
12 In 2001, the average lowest living standard in Beijing is 280 Yuan per month; it is 180 Yuan in Nanjing, the 
capital of Jiangsu province and 300 Yuan in Guangzhou, the capital of Guangdong province. Refer to People’s 
Daily on line: http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shenghuo/200/8492/8493/index.html. The average lowest living 
standard in cities all over the country is 182.4 Yuan at the end of 2007, referring to the website of Ministry of 
Civil Affairs of the PRC, http://cws.mca.gov.cn/accessory/200801/1201 050645191.htm 
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situation better. In a survey of Beijing, there are 78.52% of migrants spending less 
than 100 Yuan on job search (Zhu and Tao 2006). In another survey, the average 
search cost for migrants in Pearl River Delta is 370 Yuan, and that in Yangtze River 
Delta is 353 Yuan (Zhonghua Gongshang Shibao 2006). The span to get jobs, in the 
data I use, is average 6.21 weeks and 78% of them find work within 2 weeks. Such 
low search cost and short search span imply that, to some extent, migrants can afford 
limited searching cost.  
 
Thus with weak bargaining power, most of migrants, no matter attaining their jobs 
through social network and government or through employment agency and oneself,  
have to restrict themselves to those flexible and low-paid jobs, at least when they 
first come to the city. The data I employ will give specific illustration to this13. 
53.17% of migrants find their jobs before migration, among whom 5.6% find their 
jobs by themselves in 7 industries, 7.9% through government and agency in 11 
industries and the left through social network in 14 industries (there are 15 specific 
industries altogether). If we choose manufacture, construction and social service 
industries as examples (the most concentrated three industries for migrant workers 
(Roberts 2000)), we will find the percentages in these three industries of different 
migrant groups are quite similar. The percentage in manufacture sector (manufacture 
plus construction industries) of the group finding job by oneself (68.66%) is a little 
lower than that for through government (83.06%) and through social network 
(73.07%). At the same time, the percentage in service sector (social service) of the 
first group (16.42%) is higher than the other two (3.17% and 12.71%). Among 
migrants obtaining job after migration, 10.44% find jobs by oneself in 9 industries, 
                         
13 The percentages of the methods to find jobs are the same as the trend in other studies (Roberts 2000, Zhao, 
Shukai 2000). 
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2.67% are through government and agency in 7 industries and 86.89% through social 
network in 14 industries. In these three industries, we will find the same trend for 
migrants’ finding job before migration: The percentage of manufacture sector for the 
first group (68.52%) is lower than the other two (70.00% and 73.62%) and that of 
service sector (19.15%) is higher than the other two (16.67% and 10.89%). These 
small differences in percentages among different methods to find jobs do not change 
the fact that there are far more migrants in manufacture sector than in service one.  
 
Furthermore, the first urban job is important for migrants’ career afterward (Li 1999). 
Except working experience, they will also establish new social networks mainly 
through co-worker relationships (Zhao, Shukai 2000). Hence the industrial 
segregation from the beginning becomes more and more obvious. Solinger (1999b) 
sums up six typical occupations for rural migrants: construction; manufacturing; 
garment processing; nursemaiding; marketing, crafts, and services; and begging or 
scrap collecting. Among them, except the last one, the first three occupations belong 
to manufacture sector and the other two belong to service sector. In a survey in 2007, 
though migrant workers are hired by more diverse industries, half of them still 
concentrate in only four ones, three of which belong to manufacturing sector and 
contain 41.5% of migrants (construction, electronics manufacturing and garment 
manufacturing industry) (Cai and Du 2007, pp.5).  
 
Notice that after entering an industry, since a worker’s skill can be improved, rise in 
occupational ladder is easier than changing to another better industry. So we will find 
a large proportion of migrants existing in white-collar-manufacture sector. This is 
consistent with Meng and Zhang (2001)’s conclusion that occupational segregation is 
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not so important as wage discrimination between rural and resident workers. That is 
also why I choose four sectors instead of two sectors (blue- and white-collar). Table 
1 shows that there about 18% of migrants have white-collar jobs in manufacturing 
sector, even more than those with blue-collar ones in service sector (about 13%). 
 
 3.3. Other perspectives 
 
Other perspectives will help us to understand better industrial-occupational 
segregation of labor market. First, the policy of the central government and the whole 
bureaucracy do not direct towards rural migrants before 2000. Migrants’ labor is 
desired, but their presence is not (Roberts 2000). Urban-biased policy before the 
reform and the limitation imposed on free migration after the reform courage the 
industrial-occupational segregation between rural migrants and urban residents. The 
typical policy tool is hukou system. Using hukou, migrants (no matter from rural or 
urban areas) and residents are divided clearly into two groups and enjoy totally 
different welfare treatment and public goods in their own country (Solinger 1999b, 
pp.4). For the central government, order and stabilization is its first consideration and 
controlling migration flow is one of the methods; for municipal government, since 
quite a part of welfare and public goods are related to local finance, it has incentive 
to take advantage of hukou to hold back the equal civilization treatment from 
migrants. Also, municipal bureaucracy may attain benefits from migrant controlling 
(Solinger 1999b, pp.9). According to the study of Project Group from Renmin 
University Law Faculty (2006), from 1995 to 2004, departments of central 
government (such as the Central People’s Government, and Ministry of Labor and 
Social Security) at least issue 9 regulations and announcements including the 
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discrimination items against employment of migrants. Beijing and Guangdong 
province issue at least 7 regulations separately and it is 10 for Shanghai. Those 
regulations require enterprises should only hire migrants when local laborers are not 
enough; limit occupations and industries to keep from migrants; ask migrants to have 
extra train and certificates before employment and thus increase the labor cost of 
enterprises (Solinger 1999b, pp.79-84, Zhao, Shukai 2000, Project Group from 
Renmin University Law Faculty 2006, Zhou 2006). And it is especially obvious from 
1994 to 1998, when xiagang (laid-off) problem becomes severe accompanying the 
advance of the reform. Most of cities announce policies to prevent migrants entering 
“good” jobs (Zhou 2006, Zhao, Yaohui 2000). For example, in 1995, Beijing 
government divides all jobs into three catalogues A, B, and C according to the 
reference of resident workers. The new policy prohibits migrant workers to enter A, 
and limits them to undertake B and encourages C. Jobs in catalogue A and B include 
segregation of both industry and occupation and quite a lot concentrate on service 
sector (Zhou 2006). Many migrants are fired at that time, even a large number of 
enterprises are willing to hire them (Knight 1999); and migrants in Beijing decreases 
dramatically. 
 
Second, there is low substitutability between rural migrant and resident workers 
(Appleton 2004, Knight 1999), especially in manufacture sector. Urban-biased 
policies give urban residents long-time priority over rural migrants, and the 
beginning concentration of rural workers mentioned above, as well as the negative 
image of migrants from the press (Davin 2000, Zhao, Yaohui 2000), deepens such 
impression. Hence they prefer unemployment to those dirty and dangerous jobs since 
they will lose face if they accept the latter. The social welfare related to hukou and 
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relative good living condition also provide economic support to such priority.  
 
Third, institutions and state-own enterprises, especially those with high wage and 
welfare, or having monopoly on some industry, employ workers mainly according to 
hukou and the social network among the insiders (Cai 2004), while rural migrants 
often have not such social relationship. Those enterprises often concentrate in service 
sector, such as industries of communications, banking and finance, and government 
agencies. 
 
Thus, given the special circumstances in China, the labor market segregation for 
rural migrants may take the form of both occupational crowding and industry 
crowding14, as reflected by the figures in Table 1.  
 
The data we use were collected in 1998, when the unemployment problem became 
most serious and the labor market segregation was abundantly clear. From 2000, 
local governments began to cancel discrimination policies against migrants and rural 
migrants’ civil rights became one of the focuses of the central government (Project 
Group from Renmin University Law Faculty 2006). Some changes privileging 
migrants also happened to the hukou system, though its nature of controlling 
migration kept still. Despite of the above situation, the basic pattern does not change 
and industrial-occupational segregation is still an important problem today. 
 
 
 
                         
14 Hirsch and Schumacher (1992) put forward the same argument for the labor market segregation of blacks in 
the United States. 
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Chapter 4. Data 
 
4.1. The survey 
 
The study utilizes data from the 1998 Survey of Occupational Mobility and 
Migration collected by the Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies in Oslo 
and the National Research Center for Science and Technology for Development 
(NRCSTD) in Beijing. The former is an independent and non-profit-making research 
institute, and the latter is a branch institute of the Ministry of Science and 
Technology of China. The survey was carried out in three Chinese cities: Beijing, 
Wuxi, and Zhuhai (see Appendix 1 for the locations of these three cities). As pointed 
out by the survey organizers, these three cities were not randomly chosen, but were 
selected to “explore the effects of the transition in cities of different scale, region, 
and with different economic profiles” (Drury and Arneburg 2001, p. 4). Beijing, as 
the capital of China, is dominated by the public service sector and large state 
enterprises. Its labor market is more diversified due to its size, but is less open 
compared with the market in the other two cities. Wuxi is a flourishing industrial city 
near Shanghai in the Yangtze River Delta area of Jiangsu province, and has followed 
a model of development that is based on collective and township-village enterprises. 
It is also a city chosen by the central government to test its new state enterprise 
reform policies. Zhuhai, as one of the earliest special economic zones in China, is 
dominated by joint-venture and foreign investment firms, and has the most 
developed labor market of the three. All three cities have absorbed a large inflow of 
rural immigrant workers due to their fast economic development, and together give a 
22 
 
good representation of well-developed cities in China15.  
 
The survey samples were selected randomly in the three cities, with selection being 
carried out separately for local and migrant workers. A two-stage cluster sampling 
approach was used to obtain the local resident sample. In the first stage, a random 
stratification sample of Residential Committees16 was selected based on location and 
size. In the second stage, a random sample of households within each Residential 
Committee was chosen to take part in a household survey. A separate group of 
clusters based on the neighborhood-level police stations was selected to obtain the 
migrant sample, and a random sample of migrant households was then selected to 
take part in the survey.  
 
The survey questionnaire had two parts. The first part was conducted at the 
household level and aimed to collect information about all of the household members, 
and the second part was for a randomly selected household member aged 16 or above. 
As migrants are minorities in the city, these individuals had to be over-sampled to 
achieve a suitably sized migrant sample. The detailed working history information 
over the previous five years (1994-1998) was collected from the selected individuals. 
Together, the two parts of the survey obtained both detailed household information 
and detailed working history information of an adult member within each household. 
I use this data for my study because the survey was the first major integrated survey 
of residents and migrants in cities in China.  
                         
15 One survey in 2007, covering 25 provinces and including 5130 observations, shows that 20.9% of migrant 
workers are absorbed by Pearl River Delta, and 11.6% by Yangtze River Delta, and 11.9% by around Bohai Sea 
economics area. Totally nearly 50% of rural migrant workers gather in these three regions. Refer to Cai and Du 
(2007), pp.4.Also in report from the Ministry of Agriculture (2006), Guangdong, Beijing and Jiangsu are the first 
three districts absorbing the quantity of rural migrants in 2003.  
16 Residential Committees are neighborhood-level administrative units in China. Each Residential Committee 
consists of 400 to 1,000 households.   
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4.2. Statistical summary 
 
The target sample size of the survey was 7,835 households, and the final completed 
sample contained 7,326 households. The sample sizes for Beijing, Wuxi, and Zhuhai 
were 2,446, 2,437, and 2,443, respectively. Several steps are adopted to handle the 
sample. First, about missing variables, almost half of the observations have problem 
of missing information, which are mainly on occupation, industry, monthly wage, 
and weekly work hours. There are 165 observations that do not report their education 
level, either. In those observations with missing information, about 90% of them are 
resident, nearly 60% are women, and half of them receive education no more than 9 
years. Missing wage and missing work hours, missing industries and occupations are 
consistent. Besides, they distribute evenly among three cities. Thus there does not 
seem to be any systematic bias generated by deleting those observations directly 
except that most of the deleted observations are residents. However, those residents 
may either be out of work or have special jobs, such as those with especially high or 
low earnings. Second, about dropping variables, in order to keep the analysis simple 
and clear, I delete observations who work in farming industry or whose occupations 
are farming, fishing, and the like. Those jobs self-employed17 and unable to classify 
are also dropped. In fact, the rest sample just keeps workers in manufacturing and 
service sector. My final sample contains 3,886 workers, of which 1,682 are migrant 
workers and 2,204 resident workers.  
 
The over-crowding-in-manufacturing-sector problem of migrants is not alone as 
shown in my data. It is common from the very beginning of the reform to now. Kinds 
                         
17 Self-employed migrants are a special group, as Meng (2001) and Sylvie et al. (2008) indicate. Thus their 
earnings and working hours are difficult to define. 
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of surveys, as cited in my Introduction part, have proved this. 
 
The industrial distribution in the statistical yearbooks of three cities may also support 
that my final sample probably has no systematic bias. Two points need be noticed. 
One is that the survey was held in main urban districts of three cities, not including 
counties and rural districts that belong to them, so I will use the statistics on 
employment of urban districts. The other is that since the whole employment in my 
thesis is the summation of that in manufacturing and service sector, not adding 
farming sector, I will also follow this rule when using statistics summary in the 
yearbooks. In 1998, Beijing has 37.46% of employment in manufacturing industry 
and 62.54% in service one in urban districts (Beijing statistical yearbook 1999, pp.84, 
form 3-1). Compared with the distribution in my thesis (42.45% of all observations, 
including migrants and residents), the real proportion of manufacturing sector is 
similar but a little lower. Considering the statistics in the yearbook also include 
foreign laborers, self-employed persons, and those who have unclassified jobs, 
proportion for manufacturing sector may increase and be more close to that in my 
thesis. Besides, higher distribution for manufacturing sector and lower for service 
one in my thesis will underestimate discrimination, instead of overestimate. In 1998, 
employment in manufacturing sector of urban districts in Wuxi is 65.31% of 
employed workers and that for service one is 34.69% (Wuxi statistical yearbook 
2001, form 2-7). The distributions of Wuxi in my thesis are 63.52% for 
manufacturing industry and 36.48% for service one. Thus they are very close. And 
for Zhuhai they are 48.12% for manufacturing sector and 51.88% for service one 
(Zhuhai statistical yearbook 1999, pp.90, form 3-8). Compared with proportions in 
my thesis, the former is lower (in my thesis it is 64.34%) and the latter is higher 
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(35.66% in my thesis). The difference is not small, though the trend is the same as 
Beijing.  
 
As mentioned, I define four industry-occupation groups: (1) blue-collar workers in 
the industrial sector18; (2) white-collar workers in the industrial sector; (3) blue-collar 
workers in the service sector; and (4) white-collar workers in the service sector. The 
classification of industries into either the industrial sector or the service sector 
closely matches the standard broad definition of sectors used by the China Statistical 
Bureau, i.e. the primary sector (agriculture), the secondary sector (manufacturing, 
construction, and public utilities), and the tertiary sector (the service sector). It 
should be noted that my use of the term “industrial sector” covers the whole 
secondary sector, not just the manufacturing industry. This broad definition of 
industry and occupation groups is based on two considerations: first, the 
classification of four groups is clear enough to show industry-occupational 
segregation. According to Table 1, we may see that the wage gap between migrants 
and residents is obvious, no matter of the same group or cross groups. Second, 
because of the limited sample size, I do not want to end up with industry or 
occupation cells that contain only a handful of observations. In fact, the most ideal 
classification should include eight groups in that industrial and service industries are 
divided into top-end and low-end, respectively19. Table 1d delivers the average wage 
                         
18 Blue-collar workers consist of commercial/ social service workers and manufacturing/ transport workers, and 
white-collar includes leading cadre in government, professional/ technical and related worker, and clerical 
workers. Industrial sector consists of 4 industries: mining and quarrying, manufacturing, electricity gas and water 
production and supply, construction. Service sector includes 10 industries: geological prospecting, water 
conservancy; transport storage and communications; wholesale/ retail trade, restaurants; banking and insurance; 
real estate; social services; health care sporting and social welfare; education culture arts and media; scientific 
research/ polytechnic services; government/ party agencies and social organizations. 
19 Top-end industrial sector is electricity gas and water production and supply. Low-end industrial sector includes 
mining and quarrying, manufacturing, and construction. Notice that because of lack of detailed information, I can 
not distinguish top-end manufacturing industry, say, electronics, from low-end, say, catering. Top-end service 
sector includes 7 industries. Some of them are with high wages though without respectable social status: transport 
storage and communications; banking and insurance; real estate; education culture arts and media; scientific 
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of 8 groups and shows a clearer segregation. In order to include observations as 
many as possible, I do not drop the missing variables of education, state-own, and etc. 
Thus there are 4463 observations totally in Table 1d and more than that in the 
regression sample. 
 
The data in Table 1 show that rural migrant workers are far more concentrated in the 
blue-collar and industrial sector group (64.21%) and far less represented in the 
white-collar and service sector (3.86%) than their urban counterparts (the 
corresponding figures for the latter are 28.77% and 33.08%, respectively). 
Furthermore, the mean log hourly wage for blue-collar workers in the industrial 
sector is the lowest and that for white-collar workers in the service sector the highest 
for both rural migrant and urban resident workers. These raw data indicate that our 
classification of industry-occupation groups captures the main thrust of labor market 
segregation in China well. Furthermore, the regressions in the following chapters 
show that most of the city dummies are significant. However, because of limited 
sample size, running regressions for each city separately is insignificant or even 
impossible 20 . Thus I will only list the descriptive statistic for three cities, 
respectively.  
 
From Tables 1a, 1b, and 1c, we may see that the basic patterns for sector distributions 
and log wage of three cities are almost the same as that for all observations in Table 1. 
The distribution of migrants in Beijing is most close to the average, and the 
proportion of white-collar migrants in service sector increases to 7.43%, double of 
                                                                      
research/ polytechnic services; health care sporting and social welfare; government/ party agencies and social 
organizations. The left three are not top-end: geological prospecting, water conservancy; wholesale/ retail trade, 
restaurants; social services. 
20 For Beijing, the migrant observations of white-collar job in service industry are 26. For Wuxi, they are 8 and 
for Zhuhai, they are 31. 
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the average level. In Wuxi, an industrial city, about 92% of migrants concentrate in 
manufacturing sector, and that for residents are 62%. Thus migrant white-collar 
workers in service sector are especially low (1.82%). Zhuhai, as a newly-rising city, 
is flourishing in service sector, so it has more migrants than other two cities working 
in the service industry (about 23%), while inside which the proportion for 
white-collar jobs (3.47%) is even lower than that of Beijing. In fact, the wage 
differentials between migrants and residents in four sectors, respectively, are highest 
in Zhuhai among the three cities. Another point on wage differential is that except 
Zhuhai, the pattern of hourly wage for migrants are different from that of residents. 
In the service sector of Beijing, blue-collar workers earn more than white-collar ones. 
And this is also the case for migrants in both industries of Wuxi. Though there exists 
difference among cities, residents’ sector-distribution and hourly log wage are 
obviously distinguished from migrants’.  
 
For the multinomial logit model of industry-occupation selection, the vector of the 
independent variables Z should include those variables that affect both the labor 
supply and demand for a job. The factors influencing an individual’s supply of labor 
are wealth, preferences, and job search costs, whereas the factors that determine the 
demand for labor are mainly those affecting an individual’s productivity. I thus 
include in Z years of work experience, years of schooling, a dummy variable for 
gender, a dummy variable for marital status, dummy variables that indicate whether 
the respondent’s father is a party cadre or is self-employed (owns a business), a 
dummy variable for working in a state-owned enterprise, a dummy variable for 
getting the job through state allocation, and dummy variables for the three cities. The 
human capital variables that are included are meant to control for both an 
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individual’s productivity and wealth, whereas the family background variables are 
proxies for individual preferences. The dummy variable for getting a job through 
state allocation and the city dummies are related to the job search costs. I believe that 
the family background variables and the dummy for whether the respondent obtained 
a job through state allocation are the main identification variables that should be 
included in the industry-occupation choice equation, but not the wage equation.  
 
The specification of our wage equation follows the usual human capital theory. It 
includes a dummy for gender, years of work experience and its square, years of 
schooling, a dummy that indicates whether an individual is a party cadre, a dummy 
for working in a state-owned enterprise, and two city dummies21. 
 
The variable definition and descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2. As shown in 
the table, on average the migrants earn roughly 38% less than the residents, and also 
tend to have less human capital (years of schooling) and lower status (cadre22). The 
fewer years of work experience and lower probability of being married among the 
migrants are mainly due to their younger age profile compared with the residents. 
Furthermore, the migrants are less likely to have a father who is a Party cadre, less 
likely to work in a state-owned enterprise, and less likely to have gotten their job 
                         
21 I also run the specification with the martial status dummy included, but it remains insignificant. 
22 According to Drury and Arneburg (2001), “Cadre”, with “Workers” and “Farmers”, is a concept coming from 
the traditional system. “Generally, the cadre identity is gained once people owns the academic credentials of the 
secondary technical school or that of the higher grades and works in a state unit. It includes the cadres of state 
organizations, social groups and the cadres, the technical personals of the state enterprise, the news agency and 
the institutions such as researching organizations, schools, hospitals (i.e. the science, education, culture, and 
health departments) ”. 
In order to have a clearer understanding of “Cadre”, the concepts of “Workers” and “Farmers” will also be 
illustrate. “Workers” refers to “the people who work in the formal unit of the city without the cadre identity and 
are registered residents in city”. Hence “Worker” should be only urban residents. “Farmers” refer to “the people 
who are registered residents in country. They may be engaged in agriculture or work in city”. Hence the identity 
of rural migrants is usually “Farmer”. However, after checking the data, I find that many migrant respondents 
consider themselves as “Worker”. It is also reasonable to doubt the “Cadre” identity. So here I will just treat 
“Cadre” as a higher social identity than “Farmers” and “Workers”. 
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through state allocation. However, they are more likely to have a self-employed 
father.  
 
The most interesting difference between the migrant and resident workers in this 
study is obviously the wage differential. In what follows, we examine the extent to 
which this differential can be explained by potential labor market segregation.      
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Chapter 5. Empirical results: Logit model of group-entry 
 
As mentioned in chapter 2, there are two steps to decompose the wage differentials. 
In this part, I will deliver the results of the first step: equations of group-entry 
separately for residents and migrants. To clarify the importance of the industry factor, 
two binary logit models with only occupation or industry alone will be estimated, 
which are followed by a multinomial logit model co mbining industries with 
occupations. 
 
5.1. Binary logit model of occupation or industry alone 
 
The left two columns of Table 3 contain the estimation of occupation attainment 
alone. I simply divide occupation status into blue-collar and white-collar, and choose 
blue-collar occupation as base group. Hence in these two binary choice models for 
migrants and residents respectively, the coefficients of blue-collar are both set to zero 
and only those for white-collar are reported, which will be interpreted by comparison 
with the base group, blue-collar.  
 
Most of the coefficients for the two samples are quite different. Compared with 
female, male residents are less likely to get a white-collar job, while male migrants 
have more chance of that (getting a white-collar job) than female migrants. This is 
consistent with the fact that female migrants encounter double discrimination of both 
gender and hukou constraint in occupation mobility (Huang 2001). Besides, there are 
more residents than migrants in service sector industry, in which female is more 
concentrated. Years of schooling has a positive and significant effect on both 
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migrants and residents, and the value of the former is larger than the latter, indicating 
that the return of education is higher for migrants. Work experience has different 
impact on migrants and residents, indicated by the difference in the signs and 
significant levels. This is the same as the age variable (a proxy for work experience) 
in Meng and Zhang’s (2001). Marital status seems to have no obvious influence on 
job attainment for both samples. Working in a state-owned enterprise will decrease 
the chance of migrants to become white-collar workers while increase that of 
residents. Though not significant, to some extent they suggest the existence of 
institution barrier for migrants in the state-owned enterprises. Migrants’ jobs 
allocated by the government significantly tend to be blue-collar, which may because 
that one of the main ways for state-owned enterprises to hire migrants is recruitment 
through migrants’ local government (Zhao, Yaohui 2000). As for family background, 
a father’s identity being a cadre will obviously increase the chance to be enrolled as 
white-collar workers, both for migrants and residents. However, if a father is a 
business man, the migrant will significantly have even higher probability to be 
white-collar than blue-collar, compared with that of the resident, whose coefficient is 
much smaller and insignificant. This may happen because a stable and formal job is 
still important in urban areas of China, though till 1998 the economic reform has 
lasted for 20 years. Differences among cities are obvious. Working in Beijing or 
Wuxi will both have negative effect on attainment of white-collar jobs for migrants 
and residents. Besides Zhuhai’s highly market-oriented economy and the dominance 
of service industry, other two reasons may contribute to this: as for migrants’ 
coefficients, the relatively large migrant sample of Zhuhai may be concerned, since 
according to Table 1, the proportion of white-collar jobs of migrants in Zhuhai is in 
fact much smaller than that of other two cities. Drury and Arneburg (2001) also 
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indicates that migrants’ situation is worst in Zhuhai among the three cities. On the 
other hand, coefficients on residents are negative may be because of the high 
proportion of white-collar jobs in residents of Zhuhai (see Table 1c, 71%). Finally, 
the constant item in migrants’ equation is more negative than that in residents’, 
revealing that under the same condition, migrants face as twice as much of entry 
barrier of white-collar jobs than residents. 
 
The right two columns of Table 3 contain the estimated results for industry alone. 
The same as occupation, manufacturing industry is chosen as base group and the 
coefficients of service sector industry will be interpreted relative to it. There still 
exists difference between two sets of coefficients for migrants and residents, which, 
however, is distinguished from that of occupation. Male workers of both samples are 
obviously more likely to enter manufacturing industry, since female often 
concentrate in the service sector. So compared with occupation, the coefficient of 
male for migrants in industry equation becomes negative and significant. Years of 
schooling for both samples appears insignificant and much smaller (about 2.3%) than 
that in occupation equations (about 23%). The fact is that though the non-technical 
labor is more popular in manufacturing industry, blue-collar jobs included in service 
sector need not much skill, either. Different from that in occupation, work experience 
is significant for migrants, as is the case in marital status. However, the signs for two 
experience items are the reverse of that in occupation, which may be due to the 
reason that most of the experience for migrants is farming and physical work after 
entering cities. The cadre identity no longer helps migrants to enter service sector, 
and the impacts for both samples decrease much, compared with occupation 
equations. Since service sector includes both white-collar and blue-collar job, it is 
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understandable. 
 
There also exists the same pattern for coefficients of occupation and industry, though 
the reason behind may differ from each other. Like occupation equations, 
state-owned enterprises are more likely to provide residents with jobs in service 
sector industry, and have no impact on migrants. Job attainment by the government 
allocation also obviously decreases migrants’ chance to enter service sector. Both of 
these two factors reflect the disadvantageous institution arrangement for migrants. A 
father’s cadre identity will help both migrants and residents to get jobs in service 
sector. Residents in Beijing and Wuxi are significantly less likely to enter service 
sector than those in Zhuhai. This may be because Zhuhai is a newly rising city and 
does not have old industry foundations as the other two. The constant is again much 
more negative for migrants than for residents, indicating the entry barrier. 
 
The first part in Table 5 (also in Table 11, the same) and Table 6 (also in Table 12, the 
same) presents the observed distribution, the predicted distribution, and the 
difference between them, respectively, for occupation and industry alone. Item 1 and 
2 are the observed distribution for residents and migrants. Item 5 shows the 
difference between these two items. Comparing item5 in Table 5 and Table 6, we 
may see that the difference in industry is larger than that in occupation. Item 3 and 4 
are the estimated distributions predicted by the coefficients in Table 3. upˆ  denotes 
the proportion of urban residents if they would face the same treatment of migrants, 
by inserting the values of residents’ characteristics into migrants’ group-attainment 
equation. And rpˆ denotes the proportion of rural migrants if they would face 
residents’ treatment when applying for jobs. Regarding occupation, the predicted 
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proportion of white-collar jobs for migrants is about 5% higher than the original, 
which is close to Meng and Zhang’s (2001) result, 5.89%; regarding industry, the 
predicted proportion of service sector for migrants increases nearly by 30%. Thus the 
industrial segregation seems much higher than occupational segregation. This is even 
more obvious by comparing item 6 and item 7 in two tables. Item 6 denotes the 
difference of distributions between migrants and residents if they would face the 
same group-entry condition, which means the human capital difference. Item 7 
denotes the extent of segregation, using the difference between migrants’ observed 
and predicted distribution. The weight of the values of item 6 and item 7 is just 
reversed in two tables. As for occupation, the explained difference (item 6) is much 
higher than the residual difference (item 7), while for industry, the former is much 
lower than the latter. The impact of those segregations on wage differentials will be 
illustrated in the next chapter. 
 
From the above comparisons of group-entry equations between migrants and 
residents, as well as between occupation and industry classification, we may see 
there exist different patterns not for migrants and residents, but for occupation and 
industry. A Chow test is also exerted for occupation and industry entry specifications 
separately. The test value for occupation is 46.84, and for industry is 262.38. Both of 
them are significant at 1% level, and the structure difference existing in industry 
classification is much more obvious than that in occupation. Thus, the combination 
of occupation and industry is reasonable. 
 
5.2. Multinomial logit model of industry-occupation attainment 
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Multinomial logit model for residents and migrants separately is the first step to 
decompose the wage differentials using industry-occupation classification. The 
results are presented in Table 7, and just like binary model, the coefficient for the 
base group – blue-collar workers in the industrial sector – is set to zero and only the 
estimated coefficients for the rest three industry-occupation groups are reported. All 
of the coefficients should also be interpreted by comparison with the base group.  
 
Compared with former occupation or industry classification alone, the new 
four-sector model shows several differences. First, the coefficient of male for 
residents keeps its sign and significance unchanged as in the equations of occupation 
and industry alone. On the other hand, male’s positive and insignificant impact on 
migrants in former occupation classification becomes negative and significant in 
white-collar job in manufacturing industry, and keeps positive and insignificant in 
white-collar job in service sector industry. Though both for white-collar, the direction 
of male’s effect between two industries is different. Second, years of schooling has a 
positive and significant effect on an individual’s chance of entering service sector, 
including both blue-collar and white-collar jobs. And the return of education for 
migrants is still larger than that for residents, and it is higher in service sector (about 
22%-34%) than in manufacturing industry (about 0.2%-1%). Furthermore, in the 
former industry classification, education is not significant at all, which is the same as 
in its present coefficients of white-collar job in manufacturing industry. Third, 
different from former occupation and industry classification, a father’s cadre identity 
can only obviously increase migrants’ enrollment as white-collar workers in service 
sector. Meanwhile its effects on residents hold and become even stronger. At last, the 
existence of entry barrier for migrants in state-owned enterprises is not so obvious as 
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in form occupation and industry classification. Furthermore, state-owned enterprises 
are more likely to provide white-collar jobs in the service sector for both migrants 
and residents, but this may simply reflect the fact that the government still 
monopolizes top-end service activities in China.  
 
Not surprisingly, several variables keep the same pattern in present four-sector 
equation as in former occupation and industry equations. First, work experience 
seems to still have no significant impact on industry-occupation attainment, as is the 
case with marital status. Second, being a cadre’s offspring still significantly increases 
an individual’s chances of working in the service sector or as a white-collar worker, 
though the extent for migrants decreases a little and that for residents increases much 
compared with before. Third, if migrants’ job is allocated by the government, it will 
still tend to be blue-collar in manufacturing industry. Fourth, residents in Beijing and 
Wuxi are more likely to have blue-collar jobs in manufacturing industry than those in 
Zhuhai. The positive effect on migrants’ enrollment in manufacturing industry and 
negative in service sector are consistent with Beijing and Wuxi’s characteristics of 
old industry foundations. At last, constant is negative and the absolute value for 
migrants is much greater than that for residents to the extent which increases as the 
sector becomes better and better. 
 
The first part in Table 9 (also in Table 14, the same) presents the observed 
distribution, the predicted distribution, and the difference between them for four 
industry-occupation sectors. Item 5 illustrates the difference of observed proportion 
between migrants and residents. The most obvious difference exists in blue-collar 
workers in the manufacturing industry and white-collar workers in the service sector, 
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the worst and the best. The explained difference, item6, and residual difference, item 
7, give a clearer illustration. We can see that the predicted proportion of rural migrant 
workers working as blue-collar workers in the industrial sector is far below the actual 
proportion, whereas the predicted proportion of rural migrant workers working as 
white-collar workers in the service sector is far higher than the actual proportion. In 
contrast, the predicted proportion of urban resident workers working as white-collar 
workers in the service sector is much less than the actual proportion. In other words, 
other things being equal, rural migrant workers are more likely to end up as 
blue-collar workers in the industrial sector, and urban resident workers are more 
likely to be found in white-collar jobs in the service sector. This indicates that there 
is indeed labor market segregation in China for urban resident and rural migrant 
workers.   
 
Thus the patterns of sector-entry for migrants and residents are distinguished from 
each other. And a Chow test is also exerted for sector-entry specifications. The test 
value is 305.36, indicating structure difference between migrants and residents is 
significant at 1% level. 
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Chapter 6. Empirical results: Group specific earnings functions 
 
The second step of Brown et al. (1980) approach is earnings functions for migrants 
and residents respectively. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the endogeneity problem 
caused by sample selection that may exist in this step can be settled by Heckman’s 
(1973) method. However, the fully exogenous instruments are hard to find. Besides, 
a Hausman Test suggests that only half of wage equations below encounter the 
significant endogeneity problem. In order to check the robustness of the 
decomposition results, I will consider two sets of earnings functions: One uses the 
general Brown et al. (1980) approach and the other is modified by selectivity 
correction. 
 
6.1. Earnings functions without selectivity correction 
 
6.1.1. Occupation/ industry specific earnings functions without selectivity correction 
The selectivity-corrected wage equations for occupation or industry alone are 
reported in Table 4. The left four columns contain the estimated coefficients of 
occupation groups for migrants and residents respectively. Human capital variables 
have expected sign and except squared experience item in white-collar jobs for 
migrants, all of them are significant. Male residents in blue-collar jobs have much 
higher return than that for migrants. The return of schooling and cadre identity are 
higher for migrants than those for residents. The former is consistent with occupation 
entry equation in Chapter 5 and Meng and Zhang (2001)’s results. This may be 
because migrants are more likely to concentrate in newly-rising and market sector 
where the rate of return to education is higher (Dinh and Maurer-Fazio 2004, Fan 
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2001). The return of experience is larger for migrants, while the increase in it is 
slower than that for residents in blue-collar jobs. The reason may be that blue-collar 
migrants are more likely to take jobs with high mobility. If a migrant’s identity is a 
cadre, his premium will be higher than that of a resident. Perhaps migrants have 
more difficulties to attain such identity than residents, so the elite effect is more 
obvious in them. Individuals in Zhuhai earn more than those in Beijing and Wuxi. 
The constant item for migrants is much lower than that for residents, indicating that 
controlling for the above characteristics, migrants will earn lower wage than 
residents. This is the same case in Meng and Zhang (2001). Notice that migrants in 
state-owned enterprises earn less than those in non-state-owned ones. Though it is 
not significant, it may indicate the institution barrier to some extent. 
 
The right four columns in Table 4 contain the estimated coefficients of industry 
groups for migrants and residents respectively. As in occupation groups, human 
capital variables have expected sign, and except squared experience item in service 
sector for migrants, all of them are significant. In fact, the coefficients themselves, as 
well as the difference between migrants and residents in industry group, do not 
distinguish much from that in occupation group. One exception is state-owned 
enterprises in manufacturing industry. Migrants under such condition have 
significantly higher wage than residents. This indicates that state-owned enterprises 
provide much better protection for migrants than non-state-owned ones do. However, 
it does not mean that migrants have advantages over residents in state-owned 
enterprises. The state-own coefficient of service sector shows that residents earn as 
much as almost seven times than migrants; furthermore, the premium is insignificant 
for the latter. 
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A Chow Test is exerted on both sectors for occupation and industry respectively. As 
for occupation equations, the test value for blue-collar jobs is 14.50, and for 
white-collar jobs is 13.98. Both are significant at 1% level. As for industry equations, 
the test value for manufacturing industry is 13.73, and for service sector industry is 
7.68. Both of them are significant at 1% level. Compared with sector-entry ones, the 
structure difference between migrants and residents in earnings functions seems 
much less.  
 
6.1.2. Industry-occupation specific earnings functions without selectivity correction 
The selectivity-corrected wage equations for industry-occupation sectors are reported 
in Table 8. Those combine the results in former earnings functions of occupation and 
industry alone and deliver a more detailed illustration. There still exists some 
difference between the wage determination patterns of migrants and residents. First, 
male residents earn higher wage than migrants in blue-collar jobs of manufacturing 
industry, while male migrants earn more than residents in white-collar jobs of service 
sector, though insignificant. Second, except blue-collar jobs in manufacturing 
industry, the return of schooling for migrants (3.7%-8.6%) is obviously larger than 
that for residents (3.5%-4.9%), just like earnings functions of occupation and 
industry alone show. Third, work experience brings higher wage for migrants than 
for residents. However, different from the regressions of two sectors, more than half 
of the coefficients become unobvious. This insignificant impact of experience is 
consistent with previous findings for China and is probably due to the fact that older 
workers had a much smaller wage increment before the reform era (Meng and Kidd 
1997, Dong et al. 2002). Fourth, when a migrant’s identity is a cadre, the premium 
for him will be as twice as much than that for a resident, both in blue-collar jobs of 
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manufacturing industry and white-collar jobs of service sector. This impact is larger 
than that in earnings functions of occupation and industry alone. Fifth, state-owned 
enterprises incline to provide higher wages for migrants in blue-collar jobs of 
manufacturing industry, indicating better protection for migrant workers than in 
non-state-owned enterprises. However, the premium of working in state-owned 
companies is much higher for residents than for migrants in white-collar jobs of both 
industries. This suggests that residents have obvious advantage through institutional 
arrangement. At last, all of the constant items for migrants are significantly smaller 
than that for residents, indicating high unexplained premium for urban residents. 
Notice that the adjusted R-square for migrants in white-collar jobs of manufacturing 
is especially small than others, which shows that the wage determination of this 
sector is complicated than others. 
 
A Chow Test is exerted separately for each sector. The test values are 6.55, 4.65, 5.80, 
and 1.60 for blue-collar and white-collar jobs in manufacturing industry and service 
sector respectively. Though only the last one is insignificant, the value of former 
three are also much smaller than that of four-sector entry functions, indicating the 
wage determination structure of migrants and residents is much more similar to each 
other than entry one. Thus it is reasonable to consider wage equations with 
selectivity correction. 
 
6.2. Earnings functions with selectivity correction 
 
6.2.1. Occupation/ industry specific earnings functions with selectivity correction 
Table 10 contains separately the occupation and industry specific wage functions 
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with selectivity correction. The left four columns are the estimated coefficients of 
occupation groups. The new item λ is Inverse Mill’s Ratio. Compared with results 
without correction, more than half of the coefficients become insignificant, especially 
for migrant: except schooling, other coefficients of migrants are not significant at all. 
At the same time, most of the human capital coefficients for residents keep 
significant, no matter for blue-collar or for white-collar workers. This may indicate 
migrants are influenced much by the occupation-entry conditions. None of the 
significant coefficients change their signs in equations without correction. And the 
values of them do not change much. 
 
The right four columns are the estimated coefficients of industry groups. Compared 
with results without correction, most of the coefficients are still significant, 
especially for residents. As for return of schooling and premium of cadre identity, 
migrants still have higher coefficient values than residents in both industries, just like 
the equations without selectivity correction. However, changes happen in service 
sector. Male migrants now earn a little less than male residents. The return of 
experience of migrants is almost the same as that of residents, though in the 
uncorrected equations, it is higher for migrants than residents. Migrants in Wuxi earn 
less, instead of higher in former functions, than residents. These may indicate that 
compared with manufacturing industry, service sector is more likely to be influenced 
by sector-entry condition. 
 
I run the specification with the two family background dummies (whether an 
individual’s father is a cadre and whether an individual’s father owns a business) and 
the state job allocation dummy included in the wage equation, but most of them are 
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insignificant. At the same time, more than half of these dummies appear to be 
significant in binary logit models. I therefore assert that these selectivity models meet 
the identification condition. 
 
6.2.2. Industry-occupation specific earnings functions with selectivity correction 
The selectivity-corrected wage equations for the various occupation-industry groups 
are reported in Table 13. Except one (experience square item for blue-collar migrants 
in service sector), all of the human capital variables have their expected signs. The 
rates of return to education range from 3% to 9%, and are higher for migrants in the 
service sector. Work experience always enters positively, but like functions without 
correction, is only significant in three out of the eight regressions. Finally, 
state-owned enterprises tend to pay workers – both residents and migrants – more in 
the industrial sector, but almost the opposite is true in the service sector. This is 
because the main large enterprises in industrial sectors are still owned by state and all 
their workers have “enterprise premium”. (Meng and Perkins 1998, Meng 2002, Wu 
2002) 
 
Compared with the model without correction, I have reasons to choose the one with 
multinomial selection. First, the selectivity model meets the identification condition. 
In the wage equation, I run the specification with the two family background 
dummies and the state job allocation dummy included, but most of them are 
insignificant. Besides, in most of the multinomial logit models, I find that the dummy 
for whether an individual’s father is a cadre are significant. The dummy for whether 
the respondent obtained his or her current job through state allocation are significant 
in two models (white-collar workers in the manufacturing industry and blue-collar 
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workers in the service industry), and the dummy for whether an individual’s father 
owns a business also appears to be significant in one model (blue-collar workers in 
the service industry). Together, these results show that those identification variables 
for the selectivity model play a significant role in the job attainment equations.   
 
Another reason is the significance of coefficients and the increase of R-squares. In 
the earnings functions with multinomial selection, three human capital variables 
become significant compared with those of former model, including squared 
experience item of blue-collar resident workers in manufacturing industry, work 
experience variable of white-collar resident workers in manufacturing industry, and 
the dummy of male for migrant workers in service sector. Though four coefficients 
become insignificant, they concentrate in the dummy of cadre. Since the identity of 
cadre is not recognizable enough, this adjustment can be accepted. Besides, five out 
of eight R-squares become higher than functions without selectivity correction. Thus 
I consider earnings equations with multinomial selection to be more robust. 
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Chapter 7. Empirical results: Wage decomposition 
 
To perform the Brown et al. (1980) wage decomposition outlined in the methodology 
section, we need use the predicted nondiscriminatory proportion attained from 
group-entry equations in Chapter 5, and the coefficients of earnings functions in 
Chapter 6. Since there are two sets of coefficients in last chapter, I will also report 
two decomposition outcomes, with and without selectivity correction respectively. 
 
7.1. Wage decomposition without selectivity correction 
 
7.1.1. Wage decomposition of occupation or industry alone 
Table 5 delivers the results for occupational segregation alone. The wage differentials 
are decomposed into four parts: the estimated within-group explained wage 
differential (WE), the estimated within-group unexplained wage differential (WU), 
the estimated between-group explained wage differential (BE), and the estimated 
between-group unexplained wage differential (BU). The summation of item 11 is 
equal to WE, and that of item 12, item 13, and item 14 are corresponding to WU, BE, 
and BU part respectively. WE is -0.0355, or -9.26% of the total wage differential. 
The negative sign means if migrants had been treated in the same way as residents, 
their wage would have been higher than that of residents, which may be because 
migrants have some special characteristics. WU is much higher and equals to 0.2861, 
or 74.61% of the total wage differential. This may be viewed as the upper bound of 
the on-the-job wage discrimination against migrant workers. BE is 0.1112, or 29% 
and BU is 0.0216, or 5.64%. These two items explain the wage differentials across 
occupations, and BU part indicates labor market segregation or unequal access to 
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different occupations. Notice the two components of BU in item 14. The first 
negative value belongs to the blue-collar job and means that there are too many 
migrants crowding into it. The second positive value illustrates the entry barrier of 
white-collar for migrants.  
 
This composition results are similar to Meng and Zhang (2001)’s. First, the largest 
part is WU and the smallest part is BU, which shows that wage discrimination is the 
main reason of wage gap between migrants and residents, while occupational 
segregation is a relatively minor cause. Second, WE part is a negative value, 
suggesting migrants’ some special characteristics advantage over residents. The total 
unexplained part (WU and BU) is much larger than the total explained one, 
indicating the severe discrimination again migrants. 
 
Table 6 delivers the decomposition of industrial wage gap. WE is 0.0151, or 3.91% 
of the total wage differential. WU, the upper bound of wage discrimination, is still 
very high and equal to 0.2731, or 70.94% of the total wage differential. BE is 0.0155, 
or 4.02% and BU is 0.0814, or 21.13%. The two components of BU in item 14 also 
include a negative value and a positive one, indicating migrants’ crowding in 
manufacturing industry and the entry barrier of service sector for them.  
 
There are some points in this result. First, there exists obvious difference between 
industrial and occupational decomposition. Though the largest part is still WU, the 
proportion of BU increases dramatically and becomes the second large part, which 
means industrial segregation is also an important factor leading to wage differentials. 
Second, two reasons may contribute to the above change. One is that the structure 
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difference between migrants and residents across industry entries is much more 
obvious than that across occupation entries, which can be proved by the Chow Test 
in Chapter 5. Another reason is the different weights between item 6 and item 7 in 
Table 5 and Table 6. That is, the residual difference in Table 6 is much higher than 
that in Table 5, while the explained difference in the former is much lower than that 
in the latter. Third, the industrial decomposition is closer to the intuition than the 
occupational one. The WE part becomes slightly positive, which is consistent with 
the statistical characteristics of residents: more work experience, higher education 
level, and more local social relationship. 
 
7.1.2. Wage decomposition of industry-occupation sectors 
Table 11 shows the decomposition of industry-occupation wage gap. WE is again 
negative and equals to -0.0253, or -6.57% of the total wage differential. WU, the 
upper bound of wage discrimination, equals 0.2299, or 59.70% of the total wage 
differential. BE is 0.1025, or 26.61% and BU is 0.0780, or 20.25%. As the Chow 
Test exerted in Chapter 6, the structure difference of wage determination pattern 
between migrants and residents is much less than that of sector-entry, and in the last 
sector, white-collar job in service sector, there is even no such difference. Item 12 
shows this trend to some extent since the WU part for white-collar service sector job 
is the smallest one in the four WU components. As for sector segregation, the two 
negative values in item 14 show that migrants are crowding in the blue-collar jobs in 
both industries and have entry barrier in the white-collar jobs. The final 
decomposition of four sectors combines the results of occupation and industry alone 
since the WU is still the largest part and BU is the second largest one, while WE is 
negative. We may see that after adding industry factor, the importance of 
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sector-segregation in explaining the wage gap improves significantly. Though it is 
still not so important as wage discrimination factor, the proportion of segregation 
increases to 1/3 of WU, instead of less than 1/14 in occupation classification alone. 
 
However, one may argue that since BU equals the summation of item 14, then the 
more classifications the decomposition has, the higher the BU part is. This can be 
explained by two things. First, Kidd and Shannon (1996) find that sector segregation 
does not change much with the level of sector aggregations. Second, though Meng 
and Zhang (2001) only have occupation classification (blue-collar and white-collar), 
they divide blue-collar jobs into three groups and thus there are also four sectors in 
their decomposition process. 
 
7.2. Wage decomposition with selectivity correction 
 
7.2.1. Wage decomposition of occupation or industry alone 
In Table 11, I present the results for a binary logit selectivity-adjusted wage model 
that uses occupation alone as the labor market segregation measure, and the 
estimated total between-occupation wage differential drops to 29.07%, lower than 
results without correction (34.64%). More interestingly, the estimated 
between-occupation unexplained wage differential is only 4.73%, which is even 
smaller than the 4.85% estimated by Meng and Zhang. This indicates that after 
binary selection, the impact of labor market segregation on the wage differential due 
to occupational segregation is still negligible. However, the proportion of wage 
discrimination (WU) decreases to 56.48% compared with former 74.61% and WE 
becomes positive (14.45%).  
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In Table 12, I estimate the binary logit selectivity-adjusted wage model with 
selectivity correction using industry alone as the labor market segregation measure. 
Although the estimated total between-sector wage differential is still samll and 
accounts for only 21.22% of the total wage differential, the estimated between-sector 
unexplained wage differential keeps relatively large (17.81%) with respect to 
occupational segregation, indicating a significant labor market segregation effect on 
the wage differential due to unequal access to industries. And just as the results 
reported in occupation wage gap decomposition, this proportion decreases compared 
with that without correction. WE and WU parts change much. The former jumps up 
to 100.67% and the latter drop dramatically to -21.89%, suggesting there is no wage 
discrimination within industry and the main reason of wage gap is difference in 
human capital between migrants and residents, which, however, is not consistent 
with intuition. 
 
7.2.2. Wage decomposition of industry-occupation sectors 
In Table 14, WE is 0.1042, or 27% of the total wage differential. WU, the upper 
bound of wage discrimination, is almost the same, at 0.1004, or 26% of the total 
wage differential. BE is also quite close and occupies 0.1025, or 26.61%, which is a 
little larger than labor market segregation part BU of 0.0780, or 20.25%. This latter 
figure shows that unequal access to industry-occupation contributes as much as 
20.25% of the observed wage differential between resident and migrant workers. 
Compared with decomposition results without correction, only WE and WU parts 
have some change. The proportion of WE almost increases by 34% and WU 
decreases that much.  
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This new results here are also significantly different from those obtained by Meng 
and Zhang (2001). First, the estimated between-sector wage differential represents 
almost 47% (26.61% + 20.25%) of the total wage differential, whereas the estimation 
of Meng and Zhang, which is based on occupational segregation alone, is only 12%. 
The second, and perhaps the most important, difference is that the estimated labor 
market segregation effect accounts for almost the same proportion as wage 
discrimination, which is in sharp contrast to the 105.74% (WU) versus 4.85% (BU) 
figure estimated by Meng and Zhang. I ascribe the significant difference between the 
two studies to the use of both industry and occupation to define labor market 
segregation. One point is that BU part may be lower bound of the labor market 
segregation since once there exists obvious entry barrier, migrants may give up 
endeavor to enter those “good” job. 
 
7.3. The extension of wage decomposition with selectivity correction 
 
There are two extended forms of the wage differential decomposition with selectivity 
correction using both occupation and industry. One is for male, and the other adopts 
industry and ownership to define the labor market segregation.  
 
Table 15 delivers the decomposition result for male. Studies have shown that there 
exists obvious gender wage gap in the labor market of China (Meng 1998, Wang 
2005a, Cai and Du 2007, pp.25) and female migrants encounter double 
discrimination. Thus the decomposition with only the male sample may show the 
segmented labor market of residents and migrants more clearly. In Table 15, 
compared with Table 14, WE increases from 27.05% to 35.43%, suggesting an 
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obvious human capital difference between male migrants and residents. WU 
decreases slightly to 25.63% and BU also drops to 16.60%, and they are still close to 
each other. Wage differentials explained by between sectors factor account for about 
39% (22.35+16.60%) totally, less than 47% for the whole sample. This indicates 
segmented labor market is indeed an important factor leading to wage gap between 
migrants and residents. On the other hand, female migrants are more likely to 
encounter barrier of sector access with respect to their male counterparts. 
 
Table 16 shows the wage decomposition for the whole sample with selectivity 
correction, while measuring the labor market segregation by industry and ownership 
according to “enterprise premium” mentioned in Chapter 6. I should have considered 
industry-occupation sector and ownership, but because of limited sample, I just 
present two factors of the above. Thus the four sectors are non-state-owned 
enterprises23 and state-owned enterprises in the manufacturing industry respectively, 
and non-state-owned enterprises and state-owned enterprises in the service sector 
industry respectively. In the final decomposition results, WE is negative (-14.56%). 
WU increases much and occupies again the largest proportion (79.81%), and BU 
(21.18%) is about 1/4 of WU. However, BU part is still much larger than Meng and 
Zhang (2001)’s. Furthermore, it is reasonable to consider that much of wage 
discrimination is caused by occupation difference (blue-collar and white-collar). To 
illustrate clearly, Table 17 summarizes the percentage distributions and mean log 
hourly wage of resident and migrant workers by occupation-industry and ownership 
groups. In manufacturing industry, the wage differentials between migrants and 
residents are larger in state-owned-enterprises than that in their counterpart. However, 
                         
23 Non-state-owned enterprises include collective and private ones. 
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this situation is not obvious in service industry. 
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Chapter 8. Conclusions 
 
To conclude, I extend the wage decomposition framework of Brown et al. (1980) by 
taking into account potential segregation in both industry and occupation. I apply this 
framework to decompose the wage differential between urban resident and rural 
migrant workers in China using data from the 1998 Survey of Occupational Mobility 
and Migration collected by the Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies in 
Oslo and the National Research Center for Science and Technology for Development 
(NRCSTD). In contrast to earlier findings by Meng and Zhang (2001), I find labor 
market segregation in China as measured by both industry and occupational 
segregation to contribute significantly (up to 20%) to the observed wage differential 
between these two groups of workers.  
 
I also perform my analyses using extensions of decomposition in order to keep my 
result robust. One extension is to use industry or occupation alone as the measure for 
labor market segregation, and the results show that the main effect of labor market 
segregation on the wage differential comes from industry, rather than occupational, 
segregation. I believe that this finding fits intuition well. Because of the household 
registration system in China, rural migrant workers face more difficulties in 
searching for jobs in cities and hence are less likely to switch industries. However, it 
may be less difficult for them to climb up the occupational ladder within the same 
firm or industry. Another extension is to decompose the wage differentials without 
using selectivity correction. Though under this condition the segregation effect is not 
so important as that using correction, the proportion of labor market segregation is 
still obviously improved than Meng and Zhang (2001)’s. Besides, regressions show 
54 
 
that results with correction is more reasonable. The other two extensions are to use 
male sample and to combine industry and ownership as the measure of segregation. 
For the former, the impact of segregation is as important as that for the whole sample. 
For the latter, the impact decreases since I do not consider the occupation factor. 
 
My findings provide useful policy implications for the government. They show that 
the household registration system is a major obstacle for migrant workers in gaining 
equal access to good jobs, and thereby lowers their wages. If the government intends 
to reduce the earnings gap between resident and migrant workers, then it must 
abandon this policy, because it increases labor market rigidity and reduces efficiency.       
 
There exist three problems when I use the Brown et al. (1980) approach. First, there 
exist the statistic discrimination and other factors that are hard to control. For 
example, the quality of education is hard to control, and the residents’ advantage in 
local social network may be helpful to some occupations. We may look at the 
proportion of unexplained part as the upper bound of discrimination. Second, as 
Sylvie et al. (2008) mention, the Brown et al. (1980) approach uses average log 
wages of different sectors to decompose the wage gap, however, those average wage 
will change according to the classification of sectors and thus will influence the final 
decomposition. While method using in Sylvie et al. (2008) is not as general as in 
Brown et al. (1980), I still adopt approach in the latter. Third, an obvious 
characteristic in all of the data sets is that migrants are much younger than residents 
on average. For example, in Meng and Zhang (2001), the difference of age between 
two groups is about 15 years, and in Wang (2005), that of work experience is about 
8.8 years. In mine, it is about 10 years. The survey in 2007 also shows that 58.2% of 
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jobs for migrants only contain young people aged 18-25 (Cai and Du 2007, pp.16). 
Thus consideration may appear that the factors influencing migrants’ age may be 
related with the ones contributing to both industry-occupation choice and wage, and 
then there perhaps exists the problem of sample selection, which is expected to 
handle in late studies. 
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Table 1. Percentage distributions of resident and migrant workers by 
occupation-industry groups 
Occupation-industry Migrants Residents 
Blue collar in manufacture industry 64.21% (0.4795) 28.77% (0.4528)
Mean log hourly wage 1.0667 (0.5040) 1.2420 (0.5580)
White collar in manufacture industry 18.37% (0.3874) 24.36% (0.4294)
Mean log hourly wage 1.0971 (0.6514) 1.4078 (0.6769)
Blue collar in service sector industry 13.56% (0.3424) 13.79% (0.3449)
Mean log hourly wage 1.4357 (0.5475) 1.6414 (0.5851)
White collar in service sector industry 3.86% (0.1928) 33.08% (0.4706)
Mean log hourly wage 1.6666 (0.8136) 1.8222 (0.6623)
Total 100%           100% 
Sample 1682           2204 
Note: numbers in the brackets are standard deviations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1a. Percentage distributions of resident and migrant workers by 
occupation-industry groups in Beijing 
Occupation-industry Migrants Residents 
Blue collar in manufacture industry 51.14% (0.0268) 21.26% (0.0148)
Mean log hourly wage 1.0965 (0.5413) 1.3565 (0.4922)
White collar in manufacture industry 32.57% (0.0251) 27.43% (0.0162)
Mean log hourly wage 1.1177 (0.6064) 1.3837 (0.6625)
Blue collar in service sector industry 8.86% (0.0152) 13.12% (0.0122)
Mean log hourly wage 1.5890 (0.6699) 1.7239 (0.5824)
White collar in service sector industry 7.43% (0.0140) 38.19% (0.0176)
Mean log hourly wage 1.4818 (0.7031) 1.7171 (0.6619)
Total 100%           100% 
Sample 350           762 
Note: numbers in the brackets are standard deviations.  
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Table 1b. Percentage distributions of resident and migrant workers by 
occupation-industry groups in Wuxi 
Occupation-industry Migrants Residents 
Blue collar in manufacture industry 68.79% (0.0221) 43.28% (0.0167)
Mean log hourly wage 1.0809 (0.4420) 1.1252 (0.4999)
White collar in manufacture industry 23.92% (0.0204) 18.42% (0.0130)
Mean log hourly wage 1.0304 (0.7390) 1.1420 (0.6199)
Blue collar in service sector industry 5.47% (0.0109) 14.92% (0.0120)
Mean log hourly wage 1.4673 (0.5822) 1.4029 (0.5058)
White collar in service sector industry 1.82% (0.0064) 23.39% (0.0142)
Mean log hourly wage 1.1540 (0.8136) 1.4523 (0.6623)
Total 100%           100% 
Sample 439           885 
Note: numbers in the brackets are standard deviations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1c. Percentage distributions of resident and migrant workers by 
occupation-industry groups in Zhuhai 
Occupation-industry Migrants Residents 
Blue collar in manufacture industry 67.08% (0.0157) 15.98% (0.0155)
Mean log hourly wage 1.0505 (0.5218) 1.5351 (0.7359)
White collar in manufacture industry 10.08% (0.0101) 29.62% (0.0194)
Mean log hourly wage 1.1287 (0.5975) 1.7009 (0.6355)
Blue collar in service sector industry 19.37% (0.0132) 12.93% (0.0142)
Mean log hourly wage 1.4038 (0.5163) 1.9640 (0.5432)
White collar in service sector industry 3.47% (0.0061) 41.47% (0.0209)
Mean log hourly wage 1.9526 (0.8802) 2.2862 (0.4891)
Total 100%           100% 
sample 893          557 
Note: numbers in the brackets are standard deviations.  
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Table 1d. Percentage distributions of resident and migrant workers by 8 
occupation-industry (top-end and low-end) groups 
Occupation-industry Migrants Residents 
Blue collar in top-end  
manufacture industry 0.05%  1.32%  
Mean log hourly wage 0.7306 (0.0000) 1.8645 (0.4846)
Blue collar in low-end 
manufacture industry 64.55%      27.18% 
Mean log hourly wage 1.0726 (0.5041) 1.2195 (0.5449)
White collar in top-end 
manufacture industry 0.05% 0.58% 
Mean log hourly wage 0.8440 (0.0000)     2.1930 (0.5157)
White collar in low-end  
manufacture industry 12.80% 12.83% 
Mean log hourly wage 1.4309 (0.5379) 1.6067 (0.5765)
Blue collar in top-end 
service sector industry 3.35%  7.73%  
Mean log hourly wage 1.1401 (0.7225) 1.5605 (0.6636)
Blue collar in low-end 
service sector industry 15.02% 16.32% 
Mean log hourly wage 1.0548 (0.6327) 1.2801 (0.7102)
White collar in top-end  
service sector industry 1.77%        25.82% 
Mean log hourly wage 1.5525 (0.7493)      1.8064 (0.6517)
White collar in low-end  
service sector industry 2.12%       7.77% 
Mean log hourly wage 1.6706 (0.8511)      1.8010 (0.7424)
Total 100%           100% 
sample 2031          2432 
Note: numbers in the brackets are standard deviations.  
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Table 2. Variable meaning and descriptive statistics 
Variable Definition Means and Standard Deviations 
  Migrants Residents 
Log wage Log hourly wage 1.1443 (0.5770) 1.5294 (0.6712) 
Male  Dummy=1 for male 0.6141 (0.4869) 0.5345 (0.4989) 
Married Dummy=1 for currently married 0.4584 (0.4984) 0.8353 (0.3710) 
Schooling Years of schooling 9.2718 (2.5921) 11.196 (3.2556) 
Experience Years of working experience 9.0690 (8.0275) 19.568 (10.318) 
Cadre Dummy=1 for party cadre 0.0517 (0.2215) 0.3312 (0.4708) 
State-owned Dummy=1 for working in a state-owned enterprise 0.2366 (0.4251) 0.6175 (0.4861) 
Allocated Dummy=1 for getting the job through state allocation 0.0357 (0.1855) 0.2078 (0.4058) 
Father-cadre  Dummy=1 if the respondent’s father is a party cadre 0.1195 (0.3245) 0.3530 (0.4780) 
Father-business Dummy=1 if the respondent’s father owns business 0.0470 (0.2116) 0.0191 (0.1368) 
Beijing Dummy=1 if the sample is from Beijing 0.2081 (0.4061) 0.3457 (0.4757) 
Wuxi Dummy=1 if the sample is from Wuxi 0.2610 (0.4393) 0.4015 (0.4903) 
Sample size  1682 2204 
 
 
 
 
 
 
60 
 
Table 3. Binary logit model of occupation/ industry attainment  
Variable Occupation    Industry 
 
Migrants Residents  
 
Migrants Residents 
White collar White collar 
 
Service sector Service sector 
 
Male 0.02891 (0.859) -0.64851 (0.000)  -0.45434 (0.001) -0.38000 (0.000) 
Schooling 0.25491 (0.000) 0.22935 (0.000)   0.02280 (0.398) 0.02595 (0.159)  
Experience 0.06149 (0.051) -0.01153 (0.577)   -0.05633 (0.039) -0.02511 (0.149)  
Experience2 -0.00022 (0.786) 0.00010 (0.025)   0.00217 (0.002) 0.00077 (0.041)  
Married 0.27493 (0.187) 0.16928 (0.352)   0.50502 (0.006) 0.06913 (0.645)  
Cadre 2.18740 (0.000) 2.64677 (0.000)   0.25230 (0.373) 0.69786 (0.000)  
Stateown -0.33565(0.147) 0.00527 (0.965)   0.04090 (0.786) 0.34736 (0.001)  
Allocate -0.68097(0.082) -0.17440 (0.234)   -0.63300 (0.094) 0.10468 (0.379)  
Father-cadre 0.43099 (0.039) 0.32497 (0.008)   0.37132 (0.063) 0.26815 (0.010)  
Father-business 0.58909 (0.063) 0.05229 (0.899)   0.19634 (0.494) -0.18420 (0.587)  
Beijing  -0.69346 (0.001) -0.84307 (0.000)   1.47824 (0.000) -0.47735 (0.000)  
Wuxi  -1.32619 (0.000) -0.77232 (0.000)   0.82863 (0.000) -1.26286 (0.000)  
Constant -4.53805(0.000) -2.98760 (0.000)   -1.93262 (0.000) 0.43270 (0.113)  
N 1682    2204     1682    2204   
Note: Figures in parentheses indicate p-values. 
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Table 4. Occupation/ Industry specific wage functions without selectivity correction 
Variable Blue collar  White collar   Manufacturing industry Service industry 
  Migrants      Residents Migrant         Residents  Migrants       Residents Migrants      Residents Male 0.17728        0.30638 0.11727          0.12171 0.11483         0.19942  0.27876        0.20685 
 (0.000)         (0.000) (0.098)           (0.000)  (0.000)          (0.000) (0.000)          (0.000) 
Schooling 0.04315        0.04270 0.08753          0.04311  0.06173         0.05165  0.05494         0.04775
 (0.000)         (0.000) (0.000)           (0.000)  (0.000)          (0.000) (0.000)          (0.000) 
Experience 0.03441        0.01603 0.02808          0.01659  0.03951         0.01331 0.01913        0.01449 
 (0.000)         (0.001) (0.013)           (0.002)  (0.000)          (0.020) (0.077)          (0.003) 
Experience2 -0.00084       -0.00043 -0.00036          -0.00045  -0.00080        -0.00023 -0.00039       -0.00047 
 (0.000)         (0.000) (0.233)           (0.000)  (0.000)          (0.083) (0.185)          (0.000) 
Cadre 0.35443        0.30476 0.23650          0.18573  0.36135         0.24054 0.48254        0.26792 
 (0.001)         (0.000) (0.008)           (0.000)  (0.000)          (0.000) (0.001)          (0.000) 
Stateown 0.10096        0.13280 -0.09905          0.04956  0.07814         0.02177 0.02321        0.14325 
 (0.006)         (0.000) (0.313)           (0.198)  (0.043)          (0.541) (0.764)          (0.000) 
Beijing -0.08338       -0.38701 -0.04436         -0.56729  -0.10898        -0.37879 -0.15220       -0.53957 
 (0.038)         (0.000) (0.631)           (0.000)  (0.011)          (0.000) (0.082)          (0.000) 
Wuxi -0.06674       -0.52100 -0.13497         -0.76967  -0.07447        -0.56498 -0.19000       -0.67599 
 (0.060)         (0.000) (0.210)           (0.000)  (0.036)          (0.000) (0.037)          (0.000) 
Constant 0.39887        0.88578 0.22436          1.37759  0.25494         0.91518 0.45976        1.13556 
 (0.000)          (0.000) (0.180)           (0.000)  (0.000)          (0.000) (0.007)          (0.000) 
Adjusted R2 0.1183         0.2564   0.2400            0.3311  0.1922           0.2797 0.1775          0.3614 
N 1389          1171 293             1033   1308            938 374            1266 
Figures in parentheses indicate p-values.  
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Table 5. Wage decompositions for occupation segregation alone without selectivity correction 
Occupation Observed distribution Predicted distribution Observed difference Explained difference Residual difference 
Group up  rp  upˆ  rpˆ  ru pp −  ru pp ˆ−  rr pp −ˆ  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Blue-collar 0.5313 0.8258 0.6064 0.7779 -0.2945 -0.2466 -0.0479 
White-collar 0.4687 0.1742 0.3936 0.2221 0.2945 0.2466 0.0479 
 ru ww lnln −  )(ˆ ruu XX −β )ˆˆ( rurX ββ −  )(ˆ ruur XXp −β  )ˆˆ( rurr Xp ββ −  )ˆ(ln ruu ppw −  )ˆ(ln rru ppw −  
 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Blue-collar 0.2459 -0.0223 0.2662 -0.0184 0.2198 -0.3250 -0.0632 
White-collar 0.2823 -0.0981 0.3805 -0.0171 0.0663 0.4362 0.0848 
 Total wage differentials WE  WU  BE  BU 
 0.3834 -0.0355 (-9.26%) 0.2861 (74.61%) 0.1112 (29.00%) 0.0216 (5.64%)  
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Table 6. Wage decompositions for industry segregation alone without selectivity correction 
Industry Observed distribution Predicted distribution Observed difference Explained difference Residual difference 
Group up  rp  upˆ  rpˆ  ru pp −  ru pp ˆ−  rr pp −ˆ  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Manufacturing 0.4256 0.7776 0.6241 0.4818 -0.3520 -0.0562 -0.2958 
Service 0.5744 0.2224 0.3759 0.5182 0.3520 0.0562 0.2958 
 ru ww lnln −  )(ˆ ruu XX −β )ˆˆ( rurX ββ −  )(ˆ ruur XXp −β  )ˆˆ( rurr Xp ββ −  )ˆ(ln ruu ppw −  )ˆ(ln rru ppw −  
 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Manufacturing 0.2404 -0.0439 0.2843 -0.0341 0.2210 -0.0771 -0.4056 
Service 0.4553 0.2211 0.2342 0.0492 0.0521 0.0926 0.4870 
 Total wage differentials WE  WU  BE  BU 
 0.3850 0.0151 (3.91%) 0.2731 (70.94%)  0.0155 (4.02%)  0.0814 (21.13%) 
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Table 7. Multinomial logit model of industry-occupation attainment  
Variable Migrants   Residents   
 
White collar in  Blue collar in White collar in  
 
White collar in  Blue collar in White collar in  
M industry S industry S industry M industry S industry S industry 
Male -0.63532 (0.000) -0.16138 (0.366) 0.18119 (0.581)  -0.28550 (0.023) -0.54370 (0.001) -0.93956 (0.000) 
Schooling 0.01491 (0.625) 0.24539 (0.000) 0.33519 (0.000)  0.00214 (0.935) 0.22466 (0 .000) 0.23567 (0.000) 
Experience -0.02693 (0.378) 0.09938 (0.006) -0.07166 (0.204)  -0.04536 (0.055) -0.03472 (0.233) -0.03563 (0.171) 
Experience2 0.00146 (0.068) -0.00114 (0.243) 0.00365 (0.006)  0.00105 (0.043) 0.00138 (0.029) 0.00165 (0.004) 
Married 0.53357 (0.008) 0.33675 (0.139) 0.50688 (0.220)  0.19847 (0.327) 0.36391 (0.157) 0.21525 (0.340) 
Cadre 0.73545 (0.113) 2.56722 (0.000) 1.87175 (0.000)  0 .81190 (0.002) 3.00903 (0.000) 3.14551 (0.000) 
Stateown -0.19271(0.242) -0.87515 (0.002) 0.54312 (0.124)  -0.04514 (0.730) -0.61999 (0.000) 0.33218 (0.028) 
Allocate -1.06657(0.036) -1.02112 (0.021) -0.57286 (0.339)  0.07501 (0.647) -0.28896 (0.167) -0.04888 (0.786) 
Father-cadre 0.13213 (0.590) 0.26078 (0.271) 1.09607 (0.002)  0.30552 (0.035) 0.38362 (0.029) 0.53963 (0.001) 
Father-business 0.26975 (0.391) 0.65291 (0.062) 0.62222 (0.342)  -0.32912 (0.480) -0.08331 (0.881) -0.15577 (0.761) 
Beijing  1.58736 (0.000) -0.54177 (0.037) 0 .55342 (0.123)  -0.37801 (0.036) -0.83130 (0.000) -1.20716 (0.000) 
Wuxi  0.88666 (0.000) -1.14450 (0.000) -0.92398 (0.052)   -1.49212 (0 .000) -1.02356 (0.000) -1.81820 (0.000) 
Constant -1.89254(0.000) -4.52627 (0.000) -7.06480 (0.000)  0.87510 (0.020) -2.82366 (0.000) -2.29381 (0.000) 
N     1682          2204   
Note: Figures in parentheses indicate p-values. M denotes for industrial sector and S for service sector. 
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Table 8. Industry-occupation specific wage functions without multinomial selection 
Variable Blue collar in M industry White collar in M industry  Blue collar in S industry White collar in S industry 
  Migrants      Residents Migrant         Residents  Migrants       Residents Migrants      Residents 
Male 0.14755        0.28260 0.27139          0.34045  0.05744         0.08534  0.30396        0.13055 
 (0.000)         (0.000) (0.000)           (0.000)  (0.425)          (0.115) (0.135)          (0.001) 
Schooling 0.04439        0.04884 0.03656          0.03539  0.07881         0.04325 0.08601        0.04352 
 (0.000)         (0.000) (0.016)           (0.001)  (0.000)          (0.000) (0.030)          (0.000) 
Experience 0.04069        0.01540 0.01672          0.01031  0.02079         0.01135 0.03084        0.01948 
 (0.000)         (0.035) (0.166)           (0.159)  (0.116)          (0.220) (0.288)          (0.003) 
Experience2 -0.00097       -0.00026 -0.00045        -0.00044  -0.00012       -0.00025 -0.00073       -0.00056 
 (0.000)         (0.143) (0.194)           (0.005)  (0.746)          (0.227) (0.296)          (0.000) 
Cadre 0.39303       0.13649 0.24522          0.37199  0.17395        0.23477 0.39227        0.15102 
 (0.003)         (0.181) (0.265)           (0.000)  (0.056)          (0.001) (0.127)          (0.001) 
Stateown 0.12327        0.08766 0.05789          0.17638  -0.09549      -0.08845 -0.23379        0.07827 
 (0.002)         (0.042) (0.486)           (0.001)  (0.420)          (0.164) (0.260)          (0.120) 
Beijing -0.13333       -0.33562 -0.03924        -0.39888  0.07202        -0.34306 -0.41561       -0.61658 
 (0.004)         (0.000) (0.681)           (0.000)  (0.504)          (0.000) (0.055)          (0.000) 
Wuxi -0.07225       -0.44479 -0.07777        -0.54800  -0.01975       -0.65161 -0.57081       -0.77413 
 (0.055)         (0.000) (0.419)           (0.000)  (0.858)          (0.000) (0.058)          (0.000) 
Constant 0.36678        0.72394 0.54409          1.06610  0.34133         1.27540 0.48711        1.40660 
 (0.000)         (0.000) (0.003)           (0.000)  (0.053)          (0.000) (0.332)          (0.000) 
Adjusted R2 0.1436          0.2018 0.0649            0.2914  0.2114           0.2610 0.2930          0.3501 
N 1080             634 309                537  228               304 65                729 
Figures in parentheses indicate p-values. M denotes for industrial sector, and S for service sector. 
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Table 9. Wage decompositions without multinomial selection 
Occupation- Observed distribution Predicted distribution Observed difference Explained difference Residual difference 
industry up  rp  upˆ  rpˆ  ru pp −  ru pp ˆ−  rr pp −ˆ  
 group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
B-M 0.2877  0.6421 0.4026 0.3739 -0.3544 -0.0862 -0.2682 
W-M 0.2436 0.1837 0.2130 0.3904 0.0599 -0.1468 0.2067 
B-S 0.1379 0.1356 0.2224 0.0915 0.0023 0.0464 -0.0441 
W-S 0.3308 0.0386 0.1621 0.1442 0.2922 0.1866 0.1056 
 ru ww lnln −  )(ˆ ruu XX −β )ˆˆ( rurX ββ −  )(ˆ ruur XXp −β  )ˆˆ( rurr Xp ββ −  )ˆ(ln ruu ppw −  )ˆ(ln rru ppw −  
 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
B-M 0.1753 -0.0326 0.2079 -0.0209 0.1335 -0.1070 -0.3331 
W-M 0.3166 0.0806 0.2360 0.0148 0.0434 -0.2067 0.2910 
B-S 0.2057 -0.1384 0.3441 -0.0188 0.0467 0.0761 -0.0723 
W-S 0.1562 -0.0099 0.1661 -0.0004 0.0064 0.3401 0.1924 
 Total wage differentials WE  WU  BE  BU 
 0.3850 -0.0253 (-6.57%) 0.2299 (59.70%)  0.1025 (26.61%)  0.0780 (20.25%) 
Note: B-M denotes for blue-collar in industrial sector, W-M for white-collar in industrial sector. B-S for blue-collar in service sector, and W-S for 
white-collar in service sector.    
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Table 10. Occupation/ Industry specific wage functions with selectivity correction 
Variable Blue collar  White collar   Manufacturing industry Service industry 
  Migrants      Residents Migrant         Residents  Migrants       Residents Migrants      Residents Male 0.11652        0.17623 0.10824          0.22918 0.32126         0.31257  0.32714        0.33655 
 (0.108)         (0.000) (0.230)           (0.001)  (0.002)          (0.000) (0.001)          (0.002) 
Schooling 0.05471        0.02462 0.04201          0.00615  0.05285         0.03824  0.05204         0.03512
 (0.050)         (0.013) (0.257)           (0.742)  (0.000)          (0.000) (0.001)          (0.025) 
Experience 0.01839        0.01753 0.01378          0.01766  0.02069         0.01941 0.02047        0.02055 
 (0.177)         (0.002) (0.435)           (0.028)  (0.063)          (0.005) (0.075)          (0.080) 
Experience2 -0.00026       -0.00052 -0.00021          -0.00058  -0.00051        -0.00063 -0.00053       -0.00067 
 (0.415)         (0.000) (0.604)           (0.002)  (0.157)          (0.000) (0.152)          (0.017) 
Cadre -0.02514       -0.08911 -0.15592        -0.32851  0.44693         0.08133 0.43858        0.03550 
 (0.908)         (0. 454) (0.617)           (0.163)  (0.004)          (0.397) (0.007)          (0.837) 
Stateown -0.05292       0.05328 -0.04227          0.04983  0.02312         0.04702 0.02181        0.02290 
 (0.618)         (0.178) (0.748)           (0.388)  (0.766)          (0.457) (0.789)          (0.836) 
Beijing 0.03687       -0.49504 0.06234          -0.43136  -0.27866        -0.41724 -0.30839       -0.38609 
 (0.744)         (0.000) (0.662)           (0.000)  (0.236)          (0.000) (0.207)          (0.004) 
Wuxi 0.03418       -0.70262 0.09515          -0.64483  -0.26382        -0.31988 -0.27858       -0.24238 
 (0.839)         (0.000) (0.657)           (0.000)  (0.092)          (0.051) (0.080)          (0.408) 
Constant 1.06370         1.90360 1.66970          2.63130  0.78005         1.66840 1.01580        2.21670 
 (0.105)         (0.000) (0.122)           (0.000)  (0.178)          (0.000) (0.219)          (0.002) 
λ -0.32854        -0.33364 -0.78591        -0.93606  -0.20047       -0.81260 -0.43219        -1.5220 
  (0.185)         (0.014) (0.172)           (0.025)  (0.562)          (0.021) (0.490)          (0.119) 
Adjusted R2 0.2423         0.3345  0.2453            0.3367  0.1760           0.3651 0.1765          0.3667 
N 1389          1171 293             1033   1308            938 374            1266 
Figures in parentheses indicate p-values.  
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Table 11. Wage decompositions for occupation segregation alone with selectivity correction 
Industry Observed distribution Predicted distribution Observed difference Explained difference Residual difference 
Group up  rp  upˆ  rpˆ  ru pp −  ru pp ˆ−  rr pp −ˆ  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Blue-collar 0.5313 0.8258 0.6064 0.7779 -0.2945 -0.2466 -0.0479 
White-collar 0.4687 0.1742 0.3936 0.2221 0.2945 0.2466 0.0479 
 ru ww lnln −  )(ˆ ruu XX −β )ˆˆ( rurX ββ −  )(ˆ ruur XXp −β  )ˆˆ( rurr Xp ββ −  )ˆ(ln ruu ppw −  )ˆ(ln rru ppw −  
 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Blue-collar 0.2459 0.0778 0.2551 0.0642 0.2107 -0.3250 -0.0632 
White-collar 0.2823 0.0102 0.2720 0.0018 0.0474 0.4362 0.0848 
 Total wage differentials WE  WU  BE  BU 
 0.4569 0.0660 (14.45%) 0.2581 (56.48%)  0.1112 (24.34%)  0.0216 (4.73%) 
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Table 12. Wage decompositions for industry segregation alone with selectivity correction 
Industry Observed distribution Predicted distribution Observed difference Explained difference Residual difference 
Group up  rp  upˆ  rpˆ  ru pp −  ru pp ˆ−  rr pp −ˆ  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Manufacturing 0.4256 0.7776 0.6241 0.4818 -0.3520 -0.0562 -0.2958 
Service 0.5744 0.2224 0.3759 0.5182 0.3520 0.0562 0.2958 
 ru ww lnln −  )(ˆ ruu XX −β )ˆˆ( rurX ββ −  )(ˆ ruur XXp −β  )ˆˆ( rurr Xp ββ −  )ˆ(ln ruu ppw −  )ˆ(ln rru ppw −  
 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Manufacturing 0.2404 0.4110 -0.0782 0.3196 -0.0608 -0.0778 -0.4056 
Service 0.4553 0.6314 -0.1763 0.1404 -0.0392 0.0934 0.4870 
 Total wage differentials WE  WU  BE  BU 
 0.4570 0.4600 (100.67%) -0.1000 (-21.89%)  0.0156 (3.41%)  0.0814 (17.81%) 
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Table 13. Industry-occupation specific wage functions with multinomial selection 
Variable Blue collar in M industry White collar in M industry  Blue collar in S industry White collar in S industry 
  Migrants      Residents Migrant         Residents  Migrants       Residents Migrants      Residents 
Male 0.17517        0.33939 0.23810          0.32416  0.06399         0.09101  0.30560        0.21389 
 (0.000)         (0.000) (0.047)           (0.000)  (0.364)          (0.129) (0.101)          (0.000) 
Schooling 0.03459        0.03639 0.03432          0.05232  0.05849         0.04666 0.09631        0.02591 
 (0.000)         (0.005) (0.034)           (0.001)  (0.008)          (0.000) (0.145)          (0.020) 
Experience 0.03697        0.01844 0.01670          0.01278  0.00793         0.01099 0.02916        0.02022 
 (0.000)         (0.015) (0.159)           (0.085)  (0.645)          (0.228) (0.300)          (0.002) 
Experience2 -0.00098       -0.00038 -0.00042        -0.00044  0.00015        -0.00024 -0.00063       -0.00063 
 (0.000)         (0.057) (0.238)           (0.004)  (0.741)          (0.238) (0.438)          (0.000) 
Cadre 0.15283       -0.15737 0.22745          0.65197  -0.03058        0.29053 0.42381        -0.10420 
 (0.398)         (0.530) (0.306)           (0.001)  (0.880)          (0.020) (0.144)          (0.405) 
Stateown 0.14467        0.09196 0.04804          0.18833  -0.00300       -0.12899 -0.21184       -0.00677 
 (0.001)         (0.032) (0.579)           (0.000)  (0.983)          (0.193) (0.345)          (0.914) 
Beijing -0.19902       -0.25386 0.04732         -0.42993  0.17703        -0.34362 -0.40044       -0.52194 
 (0.001)         (0.007) (0.858)           (0.000)  (0.208)          (0.000) (0.060)          (0.000) 
Wuxi -0.07946       -0.27195 -0.02017        -0.41594  0.10625        -0.63386 -0.59968       -0.64820 
 (0.037)         (0.067) (0.915)           (0.000)  (0.498)          (0.000) (0.057)          (0.000) 
Constant 0.34421        0.44021 0.36841          1.23666  0.99848         1.05377 0.19488        2.08109 
 (0.000)        (0.083) (0.489)           (0.000)  (0.100)          (0.019) (0.905)          (0.000) 
λ 0.26304        0.27781 0.12178         -0.38924  -0.26926        0.11188 0.08111        -0.37632 
 (0.080)         (0.206) (0.726)           (0.124)  (0.259)          (0.598) (0.853)          (0.028) 
Adjusted R2 0.1451          0.2025 0.0622            0.2932  0.2122           0.2592 0.2805          0.3535 
N 1080             634 309                537  228               304 65                729 
Figures in parentheses indicate p-values. M denotes for industrial sector, and S for service sector. 
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Table 14. Wage decompositions with multinomial selection 
Occupation- Observed distribution Predicted distribution Observed difference Explained difference Residual difference 
industry up  rp  upˆ  rpˆ  ru pp −  ru pp ˆ−  rr pp −ˆ  
 group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
B-M 0.2877  0.6421 0.4026 0.3739 -0.3544 -0.0862 -0.2682 
W-M 0.2436 0.1837 0.2130 0.3904 0.0599 -0.1468 0.2067 
B-S 0.1379 0.1356 0.2224 0.0915 0.0023 0.0464 -0.0441 
W-S 0.3308 0.0386 0.1621 0.1442 0.2922 0.1866 0.1056 
 ru ww lnln −  )(ˆ ruu XX −β )ˆˆ( rurX ββ −  )(ˆ ruur XXp −β  )ˆˆ( rurr Xp ββ −  )ˆ(ln ruu ppw −  )ˆ(ln rru ppw −  
 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
B-M 0.1753 0.1131 0.0621 0.0726 0.0399 -0.10702 -0.3331 
W-M 0.3166 0.2126 0.1040 0.0391 0.0191 -0.2067 0.2910 
B-S 0.2057 -0.1115 0.3172 -0.0151 0.0430 0.0761 -0.0723 
W-S 0.1562 0.1972 -0.0410 0.0076 -0.0016 0.3401 0.1924 
 Total wage differentials WE  WU  BE  BU 
 0.3851 0.1042 (27.05%) 0.1004 (26.08%)  0.1025 (26.61%)  0.0780 (20.25%) 
Note: B-M denotes for blue-collar in industrial sector, W-M for white-collar in industrial sector. B-S for blue-collar in service sector, and W-S for 
white-collar in service sector.    
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Table 15. Wage decompositions with multinomial selection for male 
Occupation- Observed distribution Predicted distribution Observed difference Explained difference Residual difference 
industry up  rp  upˆ  rpˆ  ru pp −  ru pp ˆ−  rr pp −ˆ  
 group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
B-M 0.3183  0.6438 0.4827 0.4344 -0.3255 -0.1161 -0.2094 
W-M 0.2470 0.1694 0.1371 0.3614 0.0776 -0.1144 0.1920 
B-S 0.1435 0.1404 0.2122 0.0738 0.0031 0.0697 -0.0666 
W-S 0.2912 0.0465 0.1680 0.1305 0.2447 0.1607 0.0840 
 ru ww lnln −  )(ˆ ruu XX −β )ˆˆ( rurX ββ −  )(ˆ ruur XXp −β  )ˆˆ( rurr Xp ββ −  )ˆ(ln ruu ppw −  )ˆ(ln rru ppw −  
 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
B-M 0.2107 0.0947 0.1160 0.0610 0.0747 -0.1591 -0.2871 
W-M 0.3535 0.3869 -0.0335 0.0655 -0.0057 -0.1799 0.3019 
B-S 0.2154 -0.0413 0.2567 -0.0058 0.0360 0.1171 -0.1119 
W-S 0.1652 0.3169 -0.1517 0.0147 -0.0071 0.3073 0.1605 
 Total wage differentials WE  WU  BE  BU 
 0.3824 0.1355 (35.43%) 0.0980 (25.63%)  0.0854 (22.35%)  0.0635 (16.60%) 
Note: B-M denotes for blue-collar in industrial sector, W-M for white-collar in industrial sector. B-S for blue-collar in service sector, and W-S for 
white-collar in service sector.    
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Table 16. Wage decompositions with multinomial selection for industry and ownership 
Occupation- Observed distribution Predicted distribution Observed difference Explained difference Residual difference 
industry up  rp  upˆ  rpˆ  ru pp −  ru pp ˆ−  rr pp −ˆ  
 group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
N-M 0.1942 0.6159 0.3944 0.3058 -0.4217 -0.1116 -0.3101 
S-M 0.2309 0.1617 0.2308 0.1651 0.0692 0.0658 0.0034 
N-S 0.1883 0.1474 0.1859 0.2947 0.0409 -0.1064 0.1473 
S-S 0.3866 0.0749 0.1889 0.2344 0.3117 0.1522 0.1595 
 ru ww lnln −  )(ˆ ruu XX −β )ˆˆ( rurX ββ −  )(ˆ ruur XXp −β  )ˆˆ( rurr Xp ββ −  )ˆ(ln ruu ppw −  )ˆ(ln rru ppw −  
 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
N-M 0.2275 -0.1987 0.4262 -0.1224 0.2625 -0.1493 -0.4151 
S-M 0.1916 0.1614 0.0302 0.0261 0.0049 0.0920 0.0048 
N-S 0.2825 0.0245 0.2580 0.0036 0.0380 -0.1550 0.2146 
S-S 0.5144 0.4880 0.0264 0.0366 0.0020 0.2646 0.2773 
 Total wage differentials WE  WU  BE  BU 
 0.3852 -0.0561 (-14.56%) 0.3074 (79.81%)  0.0523 (13.58%)  0.0816 (21.18%) 
Note: N-M denotes for non-state-owned enterprises in industrial sector, S-M for state-owned in industrial sector. N-S for non-state-owned in service 
sector, and S-S for state-owned in service sector.    
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Table 17. Percentage distributions of resident and migrant workers by 
occupation-industry and ownership groups 
Occupation-industry and ownership Migrants Residents 
Blue collar in manufacture industry 64.21% (0.4795) 28.77% (0.4528) 
Mean log hourly wage (total) 1.0667 (0.5040) 1.2420 (0.5580) 
           State-owned enterprises      14.63% (0.0086) 15.56% (0.0077)
Mean log hourly wage     1.1722 (0.4263)   1.3011 (0.4960)
Non-state-owned enterprises      49.58% (0.0122) 13.20% (0.0072)
 Mean log hourly wage     1.0355 (0.5210) 1.1720 (0.6169)
 
White collar in manufacture industry 18.37% (0.3874) 24.36% (0.4294) 
Mean log hourly wage (total) 1.0971 (0.6514) 1.4078 (0.6769) 
State-owned enterprises      5.77% (0.0057) 13.29% (0.0072)
Mean log hourly wage     1.1171 (0.5485) 1.4910 (0.6241)
Non-state-owned enterprises      12.60% (0.0081) 11.07% (0.0067)
Mean log hourly wage     1.0794 (0.6944) 1.3079 (0.7240)
 
Blue collar in service sector industry 13.56% (0.3424) 13.79% (0.3449) 
Mean log hourly wage 1.4357 (0.5475) 1.6414 (0.5851) 
State-owned enterprises     1.55% (0.0030) 7.58% (0.0056)
Mean log hourly wage     1.5358 (0.6614) 1.5998 (0.4731)
Non-state-owned enterprises     12.01% (0.0079) 6.22% (0.0051)
Mean log hourly wage     1.4228 (0.5316) 1.6921 (0.6963)
 
White collar in service sector industry 3.86% (0.1928) 33.08% (0.4706) 
Mean log hourly wage 1.6666 (0.8136) 1.8222 (0.6623) 
State-owned enterprises     1.72% (0.0032) 25.32% (0.0093)
Mean log hourly wage     1.5829 (0.5416) 1.8692 (0.5732)
Non-state-owned enterprises     2.14% (0.0035) 7.76% (0.0057)
Mean log hourly wage     1.7330 (0.9826) 1.6691 (0.8780)
Total 100%           100% 
Note: numbers in the brackets are standard deviations.  
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Appendix 1. 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Figure 1.1 of Drury and Arneburg, 2001)
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